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REGULATING WAGE THEFT 
Jennifer J. Lee & Annie Smith* 
Abstract: Wage theft costs workers billions of dollars each year. During a time when the 
federal government is rolling back workers’ rights, it is essential to consider how state and 
local laws can address the problem. As this Article explains, the pernicious practice of wage 
theft seemingly continues unabated, despite a recent wave of state and local laws to curtail it. 
This Article provides the first comprehensive analysis of state and local anti-wage theft 
laws. Through a compilation of 141 state and local anti-wage theft laws enacted over the past 
decade, this Article offers an original typology of the most common anti-wage theft 
regulatory strategies. An evaluation of these laws shows that they are unlikely to 
meaningfully reduce wage theft. Specifically, the typology reveals that many of the most 
popular anti-wage theft strategies involve authorizing worker complaints, creating or 
enhancing penalties, or mandating employers to disclose information to workers about their 
wage-related rights. Lessons learned about these conventional regulatory strategies from 
other contexts raise serious questions about whether these state and local laws can be 
successful. 
Rather than concede defeat, this Article contends that there are useful insights to be 
drawn from the typology and analysis. It concludes by recognizing promising regulatory 
innovations, identifying new collaborative approaches to enhance agency enforcement, and 
looking beyond regulation to nongovernmental strategies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The opening months of the Trump Administration were full of bad 
news for low-wage workers. Among other things, the Administration 
announced it would abandon rules that sought to ensure that service 
workers would get their tips, help workers more easily recover minimum 
and overtime wages from employers, and drastically increase the number 
of workers entitled to overtime pay.1 It also put in place a hiring freeze 
                                                     
1. Juliet Eilperin, The Trump Administration Just Changed Its Overtime Guidance—and Business 
Cheers, WASH. POST (Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/the-trump-
administration-just-changed-its-overtime-guidance—and-business-cheers/2018/01/08/f00d3eee-
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that reduced the staff of the federal agency tasked with protecting 
workers’ wages.2 
State and local laws could help to lessen the blow. Over the preceding 
decade, energized worker movements have driven states and localities to 
promote the rights of low-wage workers.3 Across the country, they have 
enacted laws seeking to protect workers from misclassification as 
independent contractors, to increase the minimum wage, and to address 
wage theft.4 
Wage theft costs workers billions of dollars each year.5 Stories 
abound of low-wage workers and their families who struggle to keep a 
roof over their heads or to pay for food or medicine because an employer 
failed to pay their wages.6 Beyond individual workers, wage theft 
increases the poverty rate and costs the government millions of dollars 
annually in lost tax revenue.7 
To respond to the wage theft crisis, energized worker movements 
have prompted states and localities to enact anti-wage theft laws. This 
Article presents the first comprehensive survey and critical analysis of 
state and local laws enacted over roughly the past decade through a 
compilation of 141 state and local laws. These laws include seventy state 
laws and seventy-one local ordinances, overwhelmingly enacted in 
Democratic-leaning jurisdictions. Given that states and localities 
responded in diverse ways to the problem of wage theft, we created a 
typology of the twenty-two most common regulatory strategies for the 
                                                     
f4a6-11e7-beb6-c8d48830c54d_story.html?utm_term=.90632aa1f8df [https://perma.cc/3K2E-
P2LR]; Julia Horowitz, Trump Administration Backs away from Obama Overtime Rule, CNN 
MONEY (June 30, 2017, 5:24 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2017/06/30/news/trump-labor-
department-obama-overtime-rules/index.html [https://perma.cc/PDE6-V932]; Ben Penn, Labor 
Dept. Ditches Data Showing Bosses Could Skim Workers’ Tips, BLOOMBERG L. DAILY LAB. REP. 
(Feb. 1, 2018, 3:01 AM), https://bnanews.bna.com/daily-labor-report/labor-dept-ditches-data-on-
worker-tips-retained-by-businesses [https://perma.cc/TV8M-32KW]. 
2. Jessica Kwong, Trump Slashed Staffing in All Cabinet Departments Except Three, Reversing 
Obama Hiring Expansion, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 31, 2017, 2:40 PM), 
https://www.newsweek.com/trump-slashed-staffing-all-cabinet-departments-except-three-reversing-
obama-767047 [https://perma.cc/8HYG-PBEW].  
3. While worker movements are diverse across the country, they often comprise workers, 
advocates from worker centers, community-based organizations, legal nonprofits, and unions. See 
infra notes 85–86 and accompanying text. 
4. NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, WINNING WAGE JUSTICE 17–34, 71–79, 83–97 (2011). 
5. DAVID COOPER & THERESA KROEGER, EMPLOYERS STEAL BILLIONS FROM WORKERS’ PAYCHECKS 
EACH YEAR 1 (2017), https://www.epi.org/publication/employers-steal-billions-from-workers-paychecks-
each-year-survey-data-show-millions-of-workers-are-paid-less-than-the-minimum-wage-at-significant-cost-
to-taxpayers-and-state-economies/ [https://perma.cc/HZ9F-CNZF]. 
6. FABIOLA SANTIAGO ET AL., HEALTH IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF THE PROPOSED LOS ANGELES 
WAGE THEFT ORDINANCE 26–29 (2014).  
7. See infra text accompanying notes 28–33. 
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purposes of comparison. These most common strategies fall into five 
categories that: (1) authorize worker complaints; (2) create or enhance 
penalties; (3) regulate information; (4) strengthen anti-retaliation 
protections; and (5) expand employer liability. 
This Article questions whether these ambitious and hard-won state 
and local anti-wage theft laws will make a meaningful difference. An 
analysis reveals that many of the most common anti-wage theft 
regulatory strategies, such as those authorizing worker complaints, 
creating or enhancing penalties, and requiring information disclosures, 
may fail to significantly reduce wage theft. The efficacy of strategies 
that authorize worker complaints is questionable because of the multiple 
barriers that exist for low-wage workers to name, blame, and claim wage 
theft against their employers.8 Creating or enhancing penalties on the 
books will also do little to deter wage theft if agencies lack the resources 
or political will to engage in enforcement or if employers fail to 
understand how to comply.9 Further, the success of information 
disclosure strategies that require employers to post notices or provide 
mandatory disclosures about wage-related rights and information are 
limited because they fail to take into account how low-wage workers 
may process or use such information.10 
Anti-wage theft laws thus illustrate the more general critiques of the 
familiar and conventional strategies by which regulation seeks to solve 
social problems. Rights-claiming strategies, for example, rely on harmed 
individuals to file a complaint. Law and society scholarship, however, 
repeatedly documents how such rights-claiming may be “easier to bear 
for those who have many forms and volumes of capital” but become “a 
heavier, often disabling burden that reinscribes disadvantage for those 
                                                     
8. Charlotte S. Alexander & Arthi Prasad, Bottom-Up Workplace Law Enforcement: An 
Empirical Analysis, 89 IND. L.J. 1069, 1088 (2014); William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & 
Austin Sarat, The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . ., 15 
L. & SOC’Y REV. 631, 636 (1981); Janice Fine & Jennifer Gordon, Strengthening Labor Standards 
Enforcement Through Partnership with Workers’ Organizations, 38 POL. & SOC’Y 552, 555 (2010); 
David Weil & Amanda Pyles, Why Complain? Complaints, Compliance, and the Problem of 
Enforcement in the U.S. Workplace, 60 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 59, 69–70 (2006) (finding the rate 
of worker complaints to be “exceedingly low”). 
9. Nicole Hallett, The Problem of Wage Theft, 37 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 93, 118–19 (2018); 
David Weil, Crafting a Progressive Workplace Regulatory Policy: Why Enforcement Matters, 28 
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 125, 129 (2006) [hereinafter Weil, Crafting a Progressive Workplace 
Regulatory Policy]. But see Daniel J. Galvin, Deterring Wage Theft: Alt-Labor, State Politics, and 
the Policy Determinants of Minimum Wage Compliance, Perspectives on Politics, 14 PERSPS. ON 
POL. 324, 339 (2016) (finding that enhanced penalties correlated with increased compliance with 
the minimum wage). 
10. Charlotte S. Alexander, Workplace Information-Forcing: Constitutionality and Effectiveness, 
53 AM. BUS. L.J. 487, 529–33 (2016) [hereinafter Alexander, Workplace Information-Forcing]. 
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with less.”11 New governance scholarship, too, critiques the “command-
and-control” model of regulation that sets rigid standards of conduct and 
punishment as ineffective for governmental agencies with insufficient 
resources to compel diverse regulated entities into compliance.12 For 
information disclosure strategies, such as those requiring financial 
disclosure, product labeling, or toxic pollution reporting, behavioral law 
and economics scholarship has cast doubt on their ability to fix harmful 
market information asymmetries based on the faulty assumptions about 
how people make sense of information.13 In other words, even 
regulations born out of hope and optimism can often result in regulatory 
failure.14 
This Article does not, however, conclude that efforts to combat wage 
theft should rule out state and local regulation. Given the current hostile 
federal climate, local advocacy may hold the most promise for 
addressing issues confronting low-wage workers. Movements, often 
with workers in the lead, are driving this state and local reform. 
Challenging the imbalance of power between employers and workers, 
these movements can empower low-wage workers while providing them 
                                                     
11. Susan Silbey, After Legal Consciousness, 1 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 323, 353 (2005); see, e.g., 
Claire B. Wofford, The Effect of Gender and Relational Distance on Plaintiff Decision Making in 
the Litigation Process, L. & SOC’Y REV. 966, 968–69 (2017) (explaining the effects of education, 
knowledge of the legal system, and demographics, including income, gender, and race).  
12. Orly Lobel, Interlocking Regulatory and Industrial Relations: The Governance of Workplace 
Safety, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 1071, 1091–93 (2005) [hereinafter Lobel, Interlocking Regulatory]; 
Jason M. Solomon, Law and Governance in the 21st Century Regulatory State, 86 TEX. L. REV. 
819, 822 (2008). While there is no single definition of “command-and-control” regulation, it usually 
involves the state setting rules or standards for private actors and enforcing those rules through 
inspections or “sometimes with the help of private attorneys general.” Solomon, supra, at 821–22; 
see also James E. Krier & Richard B. Stewart, Using Economic Analysis in Teaching Environmental 
Law: The Example of Common Law Rules, 1 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 13, 15 n.3 (1980) 
(defining command-and-control as a “regulatory approach [that] typically proceeds by imposing 
rigid standards of conduct . . . backed up by sanctions designed to assure full compliance with such 
standards”). 
13. See, e.g., Paula J. Dalley, The Use and Misuse of Disclosure as a Regulatory System, 34 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 1089, 1113–19 (2007) (discussing the limitations of disclosure in securities 
regulation); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 
203–07 (2006) (describing judgment errors and departures from expected utility theory); Susanna 
Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: Toward a More Substantive 
Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 139, 147–48 (2006) (arguing that overly 
complex or lengthy disclosures, cognitive biases, and decision-making constraints limit the utility of 
securities disclosures as a means of regulating the industry); David Weil et al., The Effectiveness of 
Regulatory Disclosure Policies, 25 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 155, 156 (2006) (considering the 
effectiveness of financial disclosure, nutritional labeling, workplace hazard communications, and 
other transparency systems). 
14. ROBERT BALDWIN ET AL., UNDERSTANDING REGULATION: THEORY, STRATEGY, AND 
PRACTICE 68 (2d ed. 2011). 
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with an opportunity to tangibly address their subordination by more 
powerful employers.15 
Rather, this Article argues that this incredible momentum can be 
harnessed to think differently about regulatory strategies. First, it 
identifies a handful of less common anti-wage theft strategies that are 
more likely to be successful because they avoid the erroneous 
assumptions about the behavior of employers and workers underlying 
conventional regulatory strategies. Second, worker movements can push 
agencies to reconceive of their approach and make existing anti-wage 
theft strategies more effective by differentiating between employers and 
increasing cooperation with employer networks and worker 
organizations. Finally, anti-wage theft legislation is unlikely to be 
enacted in certain jurisdictions and, even if enacted, will have little 
impact in places where it will not be robustly enforced. Particularly in 
these places, the work to support, create, or expand nongovernmental 
advocacy that involves worker or consumer organizing to fight wage 
theft becomes more significant. 
This Article starts with a brief overview of wage theft in Part I. In 
particular, it describes the moral and economic crisis of wage theft and 
the likely causes for the epidemic.16 Part II summarizes the findings 
from our review of wage theft laws passed by states and localities from 
2005 to 2017, based on the activist movements that have responded to 
the crisis. By creating a typology, we categorize the most common anti-
wage theft strategies contained within these laws. Part III then analyzes 
how these common strategies may fare given the broader context of 
regulatory failure. Many of these common strategies frequently fail in 
other contexts.17 At the same time, this Article identifies several 
promising anti-wage theft strategies that avoid the problematic 
assumptions associated with these failed strategies. Given the potential 
disappointment of many anti-wage theft laws, Part IV concludes with 
thoughts about how agencies can change their approach to avoid the 
pitfalls of regulatory failure. As not all local jurisdictions will be able to 
either enact or succeed with anti-wage theft regulatory strategies, it also 
looks briefly beyond regulation to the possibility of nongovernmental 
advocacy. 
                                                     
15. See Victor Narro, Impacting Next Wave Organizing: Creative Campaign Strategies of the Los 
Angeles Worker Centers, 50 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 465, 467–68 (2006).  
16. While more highly-paid professional workers also suffer from wage theft, this Article focuses 
on low-wage workers who are disproportionately impacted by wage theft. 
17. This Article focuses on the goal of reducing wage theft. Other legitimate perspectives might 
view compensating victims or increasing access to justice as ways to meaningfully address wage theft. 
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I. THE CRISIS OF WAGE THEFT 
A. The Wage Theft Problem 
Wage theft is a serious moral and economic problem that impacts 
workers, communities, and the broader economy.18 Wage theft is the 
illegal non-payment or underpayment of wages in violation of wage and 
hour law or contract law.19 It can take many forms, including: (1) paying 
less than the minimum, promised, or overtime wage; (2) taking 
unauthorized deductions from a worker’s pay;20 or (3) failing to pay for 
all hours worked.21 Because wage and hour or contract law can also 
regulate the payment of promised wages, wage theft encompasses more 
than the failure to the pay minimum wage.22 Employers use various 
tactics to commit wage theft, which can confuse workers about whether 
they are, in fact, receiving lawful wages.23 
For low-wage workers, the population that suffers the brunt of wage 
theft, the harms are especially troubling. Even when paid properly, full-
time minimum wage earners receive pay as low as $15,080 annually24—
an amount below the federal poverty guideline for a household of a 
single parent and child.25 For individuals and families already struggling 
                                                     
18. Wage theft is not a term without controversy. Since wage theft can include a violation of civil 
law that does not require a showing of intentionality, some contend that the term is misleading 
because it encompasses non-criminal acts. See Daniel Schwartz, “Wage Theft”: The Trendy Phrase 
that May Not Mean What You Think It Means, CONN. EMP’T L. BLOG (Apr. 23, 2014), 
https://www.ctemploymentlawblog.com/2014/04/articles/wage-theft-the-trendy-phrase-that-runs-
amok/ [https://perma.cc/9TYJ-YZJA]. 
19. Wage and hour law is the body of federal, state, and local law that establishes and regulates 
wage requirements. The federal wage and hour law is the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). 
29 U.S.C. §§ 201–209 (2018). Among other things, it requires that employers pay covered 
employees a minimum wage and overtime premium for all hours worked over forty hours in a 
workweek. 
20. Deductions can include an employer keeping tips or requiring workers to pay out of pocket 
for work-related items, such as gas, equipment rental, uniforms, or other supplies necessary to 
perform the job. 
21. KIM BOBO, WAGE THEFT IN AMERICA: WHY MILLIONS OF WORKING AMERICANS ARE NOT 
GETTING PAID—AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 23–39 (2011) (providing a comprehensive 
description of the ways employers commit wage theft).  
22. Id.  
23. These tactics range from paying a daily or weekly wage, which can confuse workers about 
their proper hourly rates and right to overtime pay, to requiring workers to work outside of the hours 
recorded on their timesheets. See id.  
24. This number is based on the federal minimum wage of $7.25 per hour and a weekly schedule 
of forty hours.  
25. U.S. Federal Poverty Guidelines Used to Determine Financial Eligibility for Certain Federal 
Programs, OFF. ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PLAN. & EVALUATION (Jan. 11, 2019), 
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to make ends meet, a withheld or reduced paycheck can result in a 
missed rent or child support payment, the inability to buy gas or pay bus 
fare to get to school or work, and food insecurity.26 Wage theft can have 
psychological and emotional impacts, too, resulting in feelings of anger, 
anxiety, and powerlessness.27 
Unsurprisingly, wage theft results in increased poverty rates. An 
Employment Policy Institute (EPI) study from 2017 found that workers 
who experience minimum wage violations are more than three times as 
likely to live in poverty as someone chosen at random in the eligible 
workforce.28 A 2011 U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) study, which 
focused on California and New York, found that minimum wage 
violations decreased family income to below the poverty line for 
anywhere from 7,000 to 41,000 families and 8,000 to 26,000 families in 
each state, respectively.29 
Further, wage theft harms state and local economies. The same 2011 
DOL study found that wage theft annually costs the federal government 
$113 million in federal income taxes and $238 million in payroll taxes, 
as well as $8 million (NY) and $14 million (CA) in state taxes.30 Wage 
theft places “downward pressure on wages for similarly skilled 
workers . . . in the same industries.”31 At the same time, it creates unfair 
competition for law-abiding employers who struggle to compete with 
unscrupulous businesses that commit wage theft.32 Overall, underpaid 
                                                     
https://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty-guidelines [https://perma.cc/H9X4-H7FW] (noting the 2019 guideline 
of $16,910 for a two-person household). 
26. See SANTIAGO ET AL., supra note 6, at 26–29; Marianne Levine, Behind the Minimum Wage 
Fight, A Sweeping Failure to Enforce the Law, POLITICO (Feb. 18, 2018, 6:51 AM), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/02/18/minimum-wage-not-enforced-investigation-409644 
[https://perma.cc/X6X6-L45D] (quoting Victor Narro stating that low-wage workers may “lose 
everything” when deprived of wages they are owed after only one paycheck). 
27. SANTIAGO ET AL., supra note 6, at 26–29 (explaining that wage theft compromises the 
physical, mental, social, and socio-emotional health of low-wage workers, prevents them from 
treating chronic health conditions, induces a negative outlook on life and self-denigration, and 
disrupts their family units, leading to strained relationships, divorce, and feelings of guilt). 
28. COOPER & KROEGER, supra note 5, at 14. 
29. E. RESEARCH GRP., THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF WAGE VIOLATIONS: ESTIMATES 
FOR CALIFORNIA AND NEW YORK 48 (2014) (covering fiscal year 2011). 
30. Id. at 61–62. 
31. COOPER & KROEGER, supra note 5, at 30. 
32. Lauren K. Dasse, Wage Theft in New York: The Wage Theft Prevention Act as a Counter to 
an Endemic Problem, 16 CUNY L. REV. 97, 103 (2012) (“[E]thical employers who abide by federal 
and state wage and hour laws are at a competitive disadvantage, as they have higher labor costs than 
their dishonest competitors who are increasing profits by violating the law.” (footnotes omitted)); 
Martin Moylan, Wage Theft Hits Lowest Paid Workers Hardest, MPR NEWS (Mar. 14, 2016), 
https://www.mprnews.org/story/2016/03/11/wage-theft-hits-lowest-paid-workers 
[https://perma.cc/F6DY-PTWK] (quoting Adam Hansen who describes how intense bidding 
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workers also have less money to spend as consumers, which has 
negative implications for local economies.33 
B. The Epidemic of Wage Theft 
While it is difficult to measure the exact scope of wage theft, recent 
studies consistently indicate that the problem is rampant, particularly 
among low-wage workers. EPI most recently estimated that 2.4 million 
workers in the ten most populous states lose $8 billion annually to 
federal or state minimum wage violations.34 The percentage of 
minimum-wage eligible workers experiencing violations within each 
state varied, ranging from 9.4% to 24.9%.35 For 2013, Daniel Galvin 
found that the national rate of federal or state minimum wage violations 
averaged 16.9%, which translated into an average earned hourly wage of 
$5.92 for those experiencing violations (as opposed to the average 
minimum wage of $7.68).36 The 2011 DOL study found that workers 
who suffered wage theft lost anywhere from 37.2% to 70.9% as a 
percentage of their income.37 
The Broken Laws study, which directly surveyed workers, found that 
wage theft was pervasive among low-wage workers in New York City, 
Chicago, and Los Angeles.38 This study surveyed 4,387 low-wage 
workers and found that more than two-thirds of those surveyed had 
experienced a pay violation in the past workweek.39 The study also 
found the following: (1) 26% of surveyed workers were paid below the 
minimum wage in a given work week; (2) 76% of those who worked 
overtime were not paid the required time and a half; (3) 70% did not get 
any pay at all for work performed outside their regular shift (“off-the-
clock” work); and (4) 30% of tipped workers were not paid the tipped 
worker minimum wage.40 
                                                     
competitions in some industries—in which the lowest bid usually wins—puts “tremendous pressure 
on [the companies] to cut corners, to not pay the full amount of wages owed”). 
33. See Antonio Avalos & Sean Alley, The Economic Impact of the Earned Income Tax Credit 
(EITC) in California, 2 CAL. J. POL. & POL’Y 1, 8–10 (2010) (studying how EITC payments boost 
spending in the local economy).  
34. COOPER & KROEGER, supra note 5, at 2. 
35. Id. at 11. 
36. Galvin, supra note 9, at 330–31. 
37. E. RESEARCH GRP., supra note 29, at 43. 
38. ANNETTE BERNHARDT ET AL., BROKEN LAWS, UNPROTECTED WORKERS: VIOLATIONS OF 
EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAWS IN AMERICA’S CITIES 2 (2009) [hereinafter BERNHARDT ET AL., 
BROKEN LAWS]. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 2–3. 
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In particular, wage theft disproportionately impacts low-wage 
workers in certain industries.41 Those occupations most impacted by 
wage theft include construction workers, caregivers for children and the 
elderly, factory workers, landscapers, restaurant staff, cashiers, and 
office clerks.42 Overall, studies have found that the highest levels of 
wage theft occur in the leisure and hospitality industry,43 particularly 
among those who work in food and beverage services.44 A 2011 study of 
working conditions for restaurant workers in eight regions across the 
country found that 46.3% of those surveyed had experienced overtime 
violations.45 A national study of domestic workers that focused on 
nannies, housecleaners, and caregivers, revealed that nearly one-quarter 
of survey respondents were paid less than the minimum wage.46 For day 
laborers, who can work a variety of temporary jobs in construction, 
landscaping, or cleaning services, a national study found that almost half 
of those surveyed had experienced wage theft in just the prior two 
months.47 
Finally, while wage theft impacts everyone,48 it disproportionately 
impacts young people, those with less formal education, women, and 
workers of color.49 Although more than three quarters of those impacted 
by wage theft are U.S. citizens, foreign-born workers, who are not 
otherwise naturalized, suffer a higher incidence of wage theft.50 The 
Broken Laws study, for example, found that female undocumented 
workers had a 47.4% rate of minimum wage violations compared to the 
                                                     
41. COOPER & KROEGER, supra note 5, at 8; BERNHARDT ET AL., BROKEN LAWS, supra note 38, 
at 28–31. 
42. COOPER & KROEGER, supra note 5, at 25; BERNHARDT ET AL., BROKEN LAWS, supra note 38, 
at 28–31; E. RESEARCH GRP., supra note 29, at 34–36. 
43. E. RESEARCH GRP., supra note 29, at 33. 
44. COOPER & KROEGER, supra note 5, at 26. 
45. REST. OPPORTUNITIES CTR. UNITED, BEHIND THE KITCHEN DOOR: A MULTI-SITE STUDY OF 
THE RESTAURANT INDUSTRY 2 (2011). 
46. LINDA BURNHAM & NIK THEODORE, HOME ECONOMICS: THE INVISIBLE AND UNREGULATED 
WORLD OF DOMESTIC WORK 18 (2012). 
47. ABEL VALENZUELA JR. ET AL., ON THE CORNER: DAY LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES, at ii 
(2006). Studies in New Jersey, Texas, and Cleveland confirm rampant wage theft among day 
laborers. See, e.g., DANIEL KERR & CHRIS DOLE, CHALLENGING EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE: A 
STUDY OF THE DAY LABOR INDUSTRY IN CLEVELAND 13 (2001); SETON HALL UNIV. SCH. OF L.AW, 
ALL WORK AND NO PAY: DAY LABORERS, WAGE THEFT, AND WORKPLACE JUSTICE IN NEW 
JERSEY 2 (2011); WORKERS DEF. PROJECT, BUILDING AUSTIN, BUILDING INJUSTICE: WORKING 
CONDITIONS IN AUSTIN’S CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY ii (2009). 
48. COOPER & KROEGER, supra note 5, at 15–16. 
49. Id. at 15–22. 
50. Id. at 20. 
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16.1% for U.S.-born female workers.51 Female undocumented workers 
also outpaced their male undocumented counterparts, who had minimum 
wage violations at the rate of 29.5%.52 
C. The Causes of Wage Theft 
Many factors converge to set the stage for wage theft. Employers 
have been driven by competitive pressures, government has promoted 
deregulation of the workplace, and unions and civil society have been 
unable to contain unlawful employer practices.53 Scholars have written 
on the diminishing rights of workers resulting from the practice of 
employers subcontracting and outsourcing work, the decline of 
organized labor, and the increased privatization of workers’ rights.54 
While the larger causes of eroding labor standards are outside of the 
scope of this Article, this Section focuses narrowly on why wage theft 
occurs. 
First, enforcement is simply insufficient. Most government agencies 
responsible for enforcement allow employers to act with impunity by 
failing to adequately enforce existing wage and hour laws. The agencies 
may lack motivation or resources to enforce the law.55 A 2018 
investigation found that six states lacked a single investigator to 
investigate minimum wage violations.56 Of the remaining states, twenty-
six had no more than ten investigators.57 Employers, too, may cut 
corners by underpaying workers in order to economically survive while 
also undercapitalizing their business, either deliberately or because they 
                                                     
51. BERNHARDT ET AL., BROKEN LAWS, supra note 38, at 43. 
52. Id. 
53. Annette Bernhardt et al., An Introduction to the “Gloves-off Economy”, in THE GLOVES-OFF 
ECONOMY: WORKPLACE STANDARDS AT THE BOTTOM OF AMERICA’S LABOR MARKET 1, 2 
(Annette Bernhardt et al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter Bernhardt et al., An Introduction to the “Gloves-
off Economy”, in THE GLOVES-OFF ECONOMY]. 
54. See, e.g., Noah D. Zatz, Working Beyond the Reach or Grasp of Employment Law, in THE 
GLOVES-OFF ECONOMY: WORKPLACE STANDARDS AT THE BOTTOM OF AMERICA’S LABOR 
MARKET, supra note 53, at 37–42 (discussing the restructuring of the workplace); BOBO, supra note 
21, at 22 (noting the decline of unions); Clyde B. Summers, Mandatory Arbitration: Privatizing 
Public Rights, Compelling the Unwilling to Arbitrate, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 685, 733–34 
(2004) (discussing the privatization of rights through arbitration agreements). 
55. NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, WINNING WAGE JUSTICE: AN ADVOCATE’S GUIDE TO STATE 
AND CITY POLICIES TO FIGHT WAGE THEFT 41, 44 (2001); BERNHARDT ET AL., BROKEN LAWS, 
supra note 38, at 52. 
56. Levine, supra note 26.  
57. Id. 
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lack resources.58 As a result of undercapitalizing their businesses, these 
employers may either be judgment proof should a worker want to sue for 
their unpaid wages, or they may quickly dissolve their businesses in the 
face of a worker’s legal action.59 A California study, for example, 
showed that employers who refused to settle claims and later became 
subject to court judgments for wage theft “were more likely than not to 
have suspended, forfeited, cancelled, or dissolved business status within 
a year of the wage claim.”60 
Second, employers may engage in wage theft because they correctly 
believe that workers will not make claims about unpaid wages. Workers 
may not complain because there are insufficient avenues readily 
available to file complaints. Workers may also be reluctant to exercise 
their rights.61 Given the imbalance of power between employers and 
workers in the low-wage workplace, employers can dictate the terms and 
conditions of the job because employers have the option of readily hiring 
replacement workers.62 While many laws prohibit it, workers who 
complain about wage violations may nonetheless experience retaliation 
in the form of decreased hours and pay, increased workloads, and 
termination.63 Immigrant workers may also be afraid of being reported to 
immigration authorities if they complain.64 Those who are willing to 
complain may want to act but have little access to worker centers, 
nonprofit attorneys, or private attorneys to assist them with taking legal 
action.65 Complaint processes also take a long time so that workers may 
believe it is not worth their time. As one Arkansas official 
acknowledged: “[o]ften . . . by the time the labor standards division is 
                                                     
58. BOBO, supra note 21, at 53; EUNICE HYUNHYE CHO ET AL., HOLLOW VICTORIES: THE CRISIS 
IN COLLECTING UNPAID WAGES FOR CALIFORNIA’S WORKERS 13 (2013). 
59. NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, supra note 55, at 111. 
60. CHO ET AL., supra note 58, at 2.  
61. See ANNETTE BERNHARDT ET AL., CONFRONTING THE GLOVES-OFF ECONOMY: AMERICA’S 
BROKEN LABOR STANDARDS AND HOW TO FIX THEM 26–27 (2009). 
62. BOBO, supra note 21, at 59; see also Shannon Gleeson & Roberto G. Gonzales, When Do 
Papers Matter? An Institutional Analysis of Undocumented Life in the United States, 50 INT’L 
MIGRATION 7 (2012) (discussing how undocumented workers fear that they will be easily replaced).   
63. BERNHARDT ET AL., BROKEN LAWS, supra note 38, at 24–25. 
64. Shannon Gleeson, Labor Rights for All? The Role of Undocumented Immigrant Status for 
Worker Claims Making, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 561, 580 (2010). 
65. NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, supra note 55, at 31; JANICE FINE, WORKER CENTERS: 
ORGANIZING COMMUNITIES AT THE EDGE OF THE DREAM 78 (2006) [hereinafter FINE, WORKER 
CENTERS]. Worker centers are usually community-based organizations that provide support to 
marginalized low-wage workers. Centers vary in their size and structures, but frequently provide 
workplace rights trainings, a safe space for workers to congregate and organize, as well as 
assistance when rights are violated. Some worker centers operate hiring halls from which workers 
can be hired. 
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ready to take up a case, the worker is ‘very frustrated with us’ and tells 
[me] to forget about it.”66 
Third, wage theft can occur because parties lack adequate 
information. Many workers simply do not know their rights under the 
law or may be unaware of how or where to file complaints about unpaid 
wages.67 Immigrant workers, in particular, may be unfamiliar with US 
laws and legal processes and therefore unaware of their rights and 
remedies.68 Some employers may themselves lack sufficient information 
and not understand their legal obligations.69 Further, employers’ failure 
to keep adequate records can also facilitate wage theft.70 An employer’s 
failure to keep records that account for workers’ hours or pay make it 
difficult for workers to both recognize and prove wage theft.71 
Finally, some employers seek to minimize their legal liability by 
strategically structuring their businesses and thereby creating an 
environment ripe for wage theft.72 One widespread form of this 
phenomenon is called the “fissured workplace.”73 Large corporations, 
often at the top of the supply chain, seek to shed their role as direct 
employers in favor of outsourcing work to smaller companies, 
contractors, or temporary staffing agencies.74 By keeping workers at 
arm’s length, the employer may more easily evade legal liability or keep 
their true identity and place of business hidden so that workers will have 
difficulty holding them liable for wage theft.75 The smaller companies, 
                                                     
66. Levine, supra note 26. 
67. NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, supra note 55, at 21; FINE, WORKER CENTERS, supra note 65, at 
74–75. 
68. SAN DIEGO STATE UNIV. DEP’T OF SOCIOLOGY ET AL., CONFRONTING WAGE THEFT: 
BARRIERS TO CLAIMING UNPAID WAGES IN SAN DIEGO 10 (2017). 
69. BOBO, supra note 21, at 23. 
70. NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, supra note 55, at 99–100. Payroll records are usually required 
by federal or state wage and hour law. BOBO, supra note 21, at 40. 
71. Without such records, employers sometimes even go so far as to deny that they ever 
employed the worker. See generally Richard F. Bruen, Jr., Minimum Wage Law Claims When 
Employers Haven’t Kept Accurate Records, 85 ILL. B.J. 281 (1997).  
72. Another widespread phenomenon is employers misclassifying workers as independent 
contractors and treating them as though they are non-employees and thus outside the protection of 
the law. COOPER & KROEGER, supra note 5, at 4.  
73. DAVID WEIL, IMPROVING WORKPLACE CONDITIONS THROUGH STRATEGIC ENFORCEMENT: A 
REPORT TO THE WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION 9–10 (2010), https://www.dol.gov/whd/resources/ 
strategicEnforcement.pdf [https://perma.cc/6D69-D8R2] [hereinafter WEIL, IMPROVING 
WORKPLACE CONDITIONS]. 
74. NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, supra note 55, at 83–84; FINE, WORKER CENTERS, supra note 
65, at 101–02. 
75. COOPER & KROEGER, supra note 5, at 4 (explaining that “unscrupulous employers” will often 
use the “‘fissured’ nature of the employer-employee relationship to . . . avoid responsibility” when 
those employees wish to bring claims regarding mistreatment).   
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contractors, or temp agencies may be undercapitalized or may be fly-by-
night operations that are difficult to hold accountable.76 These larger 
employers, however, are ultimately responsible for driving wage theft as 
they exert downward pressure on subcontractors to reduce labor costs.77 
II. RECENT WAVE OF ANTI-WAGE THEFT LEGISLATION 
A. The Success of Worker Movements 
 
Figure 1: 
States and Localities Enacting Anti-Wage Theft 
 
 
Over roughly the past decade, worker movements have sought to 
address the wage theft crisis by passing state and local laws. A total of 
141 laws have been enacted, including seventy state laws and seventy-
one local ordinances, by twenty-four states and fifty-seven localities 
from 2005 to 2018 (Figure 1). 
We identified all state and local anti-wage theft laws enacted from 
January 1, 2005, to December 31, 2017, using various methods.78 Such 
                                                     
76. See CHO ET AL., supra note 58, at 8–12. 
77. David Weil, Enforcing Labour Standards in Fissured Workplaces: The US Experience, 22 
ECON. & LAB. REL. REV. 33, 37, 39–40 (2011) [hereinafter Weil, Enforcing Labour Standards in 
Fissured Workplaces]. 
78. Starting in 2005, the public began discussing “wage theft.” NIK THEODORE, THE MOVEMENT 
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methods included referring to sources that cataloged anti-wage theft 
laws,79 examining media accounts using Google and Lexis, speaking 
with twenty-nine worker centers and state and local departments of 
labor,80 and running searches on Westlaw, American Legal Publishing, 
and the Municipal Code Corporation for all the states and the thirty most 
populous cities.81 Our definition of anti-wage theft laws included any 
law that regulates the payment of wages or information related to the 
payment of wages.82 Because the aim was to collect laws that explicitly 
address wage theft, we excluded laws that solely increase the minimum 
wage rate without any accompanying anti-wage theft strategies, address 
solely the misclassification of workers as independent contractors, or 
require paid sick leave.83 
During this period, worker movements expended substantial resources 
to engage in state and local level advocacy with good results. Local 
reform has the potential to provide impacted workers with more direct 
access to the government and can more readily allow for 
experimentation.84 Given the minimum wage movement across the 
                                                     
“wage theft” first began to appear in news articles in 2005). Beginning in 2005, a larger number of 
anti-wage theft laws were enacted. While we searched comprehensively, our compilation may not 
be exhaustive of all state and local laws enacted during this time period. 
79. See generally NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, supra note 55; TIA KOONZE ET AL., ENFORCING 
CITY MINIMUM WAGE LAWS IN CALIFORNIA: BEST PRACTICES AND CITY-STATE PARTNERSHIPS 
(2015); Galvin, supra note 9, at 324. 
80. List is on file with the authors.  
81. To identify such laws on Westlaw, we used the following search phrases: “unpaid wage,” 
“wage claim,” “wage complaint,” or “payment /s wage,” or “underpayment /s wage” or “wage /s 
theft.” On American Legal Publishing and the Municipal Code Corporation, the search phrase was 
“wage.” The thirty most populous cities and their corresponding counties were determined by 
number of residents using U.S. Census data. 
82. These laws are sometimes focused on a particular subset of workers, such as domestic 
workers, day laborers, or “temp” workers. 
83. Other laws were excluded if they: (1) made only technical revisions to the law and did not 
fundamentally change the enforcement regime; (2) would be considered pro-employer provisions; 
(3) exclusively governed work performed pursuant to city contracts; or (4) were subsequently 
repealed, preempted by state statute, or otherwise invalidated.  
84. Localities that sit in states that disagree with such anti-wage theft laws may seek to preempt 
them. MARNI VON WILPERT, CITY GOVERNMENTS ARE RAISING STANDARDS FOR WORKING 
PEOPLE—AND STATE LEGISLATORS ARE LOWERING THEM BACK DOWN 2–3 (2017), 
https://www.epi.org/publication/city-governments-are-raising-standards-for-working-people-and-
state-legislators-are-lowering-them-back-down/ [https://perma.cc/UH33-GZXF]. Some localities are 
fighting back, however, by claiming impermissible infringement on their home-rule powers or 
raising constitutional violations. See, e.g., City of Dayton v. State, 151 Ohio St. 3d 168, 2017-Ohio-
6909, 87 N.E.3d 176, at ¶ 28 (finding that the state law seeking to preempt the city ordinances 
related to traffic cameras violates municipal home-rule authority); Amended Complaint, Lewis v. 
Bentley, No. 16-cv-00690-RDP (N.D. Ala. 2017), ECF No. 18 (challenging state preemption of a 
municipal minimum wage ordinance as discriminatory on the basis of race).  
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country, a number of the identified anti-wage theft laws seek to increase 
the minimum wage.85 Low-wage workers have directly led many of 
these efforts, along with the participation of community-based 
organizations, worker centers, legal services agencies, and unions. In the 
District of Columbia, for example, the Wage Theft Coalition, which 
included nonprofits, unions, social service providers, worker centers, and 
community organizations, led the campaign to get an anti-wage theft law 
enacted.86 
Political conditions may influence whether worker movements can 
succeed in passing an anti-wage theft law.87 For those states enacting 
anti-wage theft legislation, a solid majority (67%) of the jurisdictions 
lean Democratic.88 For localities enacting anti-wage theft legislation, the 
overwhelming majority (96%) of jurisdictions lean Democratic.89 
Another study, in examining anti-wage theft laws at the state level from 
2004 to 2012, found that movement strength and political conditions 
predicted the success of enacting them.90 In particular, they found that 
political conditions could trump or diminish movement strength.91 While 
we cannot say with certainty that a Democratic-leaning jurisdiction is a 
precondition to getting anti-wage theft laws enacted, this finding raises 
questions about the feasibility, particularly in less progressive local 
jurisdictions, of getting such laws enacted in the future. 
                                                     
85. Minimum Wage Tracker, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Mar. 1, 2019), https://www.epi.org/minimum-
wage-tracker/ [https://perma.cc/X7W7-FKUQ].  
86. THE CTR. FOR POPULAR DEMOCRACY, A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR COMBATTING WAGE THEFT: 
LESSONS FROM THE FIELD 17 (2017). Like in D.C., coalitions across the country have had success in 
enacting laws to address wage theft. See, e.g., THEODORE, supra note 78, at 8–9, 17 (describing 
efforts by Casa Latina in Seattle and the Washington State Labor Council to reform laws in Seattle 
and Washington); BOBO, supra note 21, at 220 (describing the coalition that pushed the Miami-
Dade County anti-wage theft ordinance). 
87. While we recognize the limitations of this approach, we defined a jurisdiction to be “leaning 
Democratic” by whether the majority had voted for Hilary Clinton in the 2016 presidential election. 
88. In our study, twenty-four states enacted anti-wage theft laws, and sixteen of those were in 
jurisdictions that lean Democratic.  
89. In our study, fifty-six localities enacted anti-wage theft laws, and fifty-four of those were in 
jurisdictions that lean Democratic. 
90. Marc Doussard & Ahmad Gamal, The Rise of Wage Theft Laws: Can Community-Labor 
Coalitions Win Victories in State Houses?, 52 URB. AFF. REV. 780, 797 (2015). Doussard and 
Gamal studied anti-wage theft laws enacted at the state level from 2004 to 2012 but had a broader 
definition of which laws addressed wage theft. Id. at 784.  
91. Id. at 797. Doussard and Gamal note that while some states that are “hostile to the interests of 
workers” enacted bills, such bills were extremely limited. Id. at 800. We similarly note that a good 
number of the state laws we examined in Republican-leaning jurisdictions do not utilize many anti-
wage theft strategies. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-1201 to 48-1209, 48-1228 to 48-1234 (2019) 
(amending the existing law to solely include a requirement that employers provide pay stubs with 
specified information). 
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B. The Most Common Anti-Wage Theft Strategies 
The 141 anti-wage theft laws varied in approach and scope. The more 
comprehensive laws have variations of the following components: 
x A process for workers to complain in court or with an 
administrative agency; 
x A prohibition against retaliating; 
x Authority for an agency or court to determine whether wage theft 
occurred and order payment of damages; 
x Authority for an agency or court to find multiple employers 
jointly liable; and 
x Requirements that employers keep or provide information (e.g., 
post a notice about workers’ rights, keep payroll records). 
Based on these core components, we developed a typology (Table 1). 
The overall categories are: (1) authorizing worker complaints; 
(2) strengthening anti-retaliation provisions; (3) creating or enhancing 
penalties; (4) expanding employer liability; and (5) regulating 
information. Within each of these categories, we noted the twenty-two 
most common anti-wage theft strategies employed by state and local 
laws.92 
 
                                                     
92. A variety of miscellaneous strategies occurred less frequently and thus were not included. 
Some examples of these less frequently utilized strategies include: (1) stop work orders; 
(2) increasing the jurisdictional limits of the agencies authorized to enforce wage theft laws; and 
(3) encouraging mediation. 
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Table 1: 
Typology of Anti-Wage Theft Strategies 
 
 
The extent to which these new laws employ each category of 
strategies varied, with penalties being the most popular and expanded 
liability being the least common (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: 
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Within the 141 newly enacted laws,93 we determined the frequency of 
each of the twenty-two anti-wage theft strategies.94 We provide a more 
detailed picture below. 
1. Worker Complaints 
Less than half (40%) of the laws examined facilitate or authorize 
workers to sue in court or initiate an administrative enforcement 
process.95 Of these laws, the breakdown between different kinds of 
worker complaint strategies are: 
 
Table 2: 
Worker Complaint Strategies 
 
43% Permits Private Right of Action 
41% Permits Administrative Complaint Process 
16% Increases or Tolls Statute of Limitations 
 
Almost half (43%) of the worker complaint strategies consist of 
creating a private right of action. A similar percentage (41%) create an 
administrative system in which workers, or others acting on their behalf, 
can file their claims and have the agency investigate or adjudicate their 
claims.96 A number of the laws have both private rights of action and 
administrative complaint processes so workers can choose between 
them.97 
Further, a smaller handful (16%) of worker complaint strategies seek 
to increase the ability of workers to file or maintain a worker complaint 
by extending or tolling the statute of limitations. Most of these laws toll 
the statute of limitations while workers’ complaints are pending with an 
                                                     
93. Because our research focused solely on newly enacted laws, our data does not include laws in 
place prior to 2005. However, where those preexisting laws were subsequently amended by laws 
enacted from 2005 to 2018, we did include those amendments. 
94. During the period studied, some jurisdictions enacted a single comprehensive law that 
adopted many strategies at once while others passed several laws and made reforms in a more 
piecemeal fashion. Because we found it significant that these jurisdictions enacted laws to create or 
strengthen these strategies, we counted each strategy separately.  
95. We only counted those laws that either authorized worker complaints or explicitly set forth that 
regulations would be promulgated to create an administrative process. Thus, if an agency created a 
process for worker complaints purely through regulation, it would not be captured by our data. 
96. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-15-1 to 50-15-7 (West 2019) (providing that a state agency 
shall investigate complaints and enforce the Day Laborer Act). 
97. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 8-4-101, 109, 111, 113, 118 (2019) (providing that a worker 
can bring an administrative complaint for wages up to $7,500 or file a civil suit in court). 
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administrative agency.98 This tolling allows for workers to preserve their 
full claims if they choose to thereafter file court complaints event if the 
statute of limitations would have otherwise run on some or all of their 
claims during the pendency of an administrative complaint and 
investigation. Only a few of these laws increase the overall statute of 
limitations for filing a worker complaint.99 
2. Anti-Retaliation 
A little less than half (43%) of the laws create or strengthen 
protections for workers or others who take action against wage theft. Of 






55% Prohibits Retaliation 
23% Permits Confidential Complaint 
22% Burden Shifting for Firing Worker 
 
A little more than half (55%) of anti-retaliation strategies address 
employer retaliation by prohibiting retaliation against workers who have 
voiced or filed complaints.100 Some of these laws also provide that 
workers may seek monetary penalties for retaliation through an 
administrative agency or a court.101 A number of laws also extend the 
prohibition against retaliation beyond the employer to include others 
acting on the employer’s behalf.102 Other laws protect individuals 
helping to enforce the anti-wage theft law by, for example, testifying on 
behalf of an aggrieved worker or educating workers about their rights.103 
                                                     
98. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149 § 150 (West 2019) (permitting tolling of the statute 
of limitations while agency complaint is pending).  
99. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275:51(V) (2019) (extending the statute of limitations from 
eighteen to thirty-six months). 
100. These jurisdictions, for example, protect the voicing of complaints: N.Y. LAB. LAW § 861-f 
(McKinney 2019); SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 14.20.035 (2019); and D.C. CODE. ANN. § 32-
1311 (West 2019). 
101. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-362 to 22-364 (2019) (providing that workers may 
recover damages including interest, double unpaid wages, and attorney fees and costs).  
102. See, e.g., MILPITAS, CAL., CODE § III-31-8.00(a) (2019) (prohibiting retaliation by employer 
or any other party). 
103. See, e.g., id. (protecting individuals who have educated others about their rights); BELMONT, CAL., 
CODE § 32-6(a) (2019) (protecting workers who have filed a complaint, participated in any proceeding, 
used any civil remedies to enforce their rights, or otherwise asserted any right under the law). 
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Just less than a quarter (23%) of anti-retaliation strategies involve a 
process where workers can file complaints confidentially, although 
many of these laws permit disclosure if necessary to investigate or 
resolve a complaint.104 Finally, a similar amount (22%) of strategies shift 
the burden of proving a non-retaliatory motive to the employer in cases 
alleging retaliation if the worker was fired within ninety days after 
complaining.105 A couple of laws alternatively shift the burden by 
prohibiting the firing of a worker within 120 days after the worker has 
raised a complaint without clear and convincing evidence that the 
discharge is warranted.106 
3. Penalties 
Just less than three-quarters (73%) of the laws examined authorize an 
administrative agency or court to impose penalties when it finds that an 
employer committed wage theft.107 Of these laws, the breakdown 






23% License Revocation 





Civil penalties authorize the court or an administrative agency to 
impose monetary penalties against an employer. Roughly half (47%) of 
the strategies involving penalties create or enhance civil penalties. Most 
laws calculate civil penalties based on the amount of wages owed (e.g., 
an equivalent amount to wages owed), although a few have alternate 
                                                     
104. See, e.g., D.C. CODE. ANN. § 32-1306(a-1) (West 2019) (permitting confidentiality of the 
name and other identifying information of the complainant). 
105. See, e.g., PALO ALTO, CAL., CODE § 4.62.070(b) (2019) (creating rebuttable presumption of 
retaliation for adverse action taken within ninety days of complaining).  
106. See, e.g., SAN MATEO, CAL., CODE § 5.92.050(d)(1) (2019) (prohibiting termination within 
120 days of protected activity unless clear and convincing evidence there was just cause).  
107. See Irene Lurie, Enforcement of State Minimum Wage and Overtime Laws: Resources, 
Procedures, and Outcomes, 15 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 411, 426 (2011) (describing how some 
agencies must refer the wage theft case to a court in order to get penalties issued against an employer). 
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formulas.108 For the most part, the employer pays the penalties to the 
worker, although, in some jurisdictions, a portion go to the 
administrative agency.109 For willful violations by repeat offenders, 
some laws authorize the imposition of higher civil penalties.110 In 
addition, some civil penalties include the prevailing worker’s attorney’s 
fees, costs, or the cost of administrative enforcement.111 
License revocation penalties authorize the non-issuance, suspension, 
or revocation of the license of an employer that committed wage theft. 
About a quarter (23%) of the strategies involving penalties provide for 
license revocation, ranging from a general business license to more 
specific licenses necessary to operate the employer’s business, such as a 
land use permit.112 The authority for license revocation lies with the 
agency in charge of issuing such licenses.113 
Negative publicity penalties (11%) require reporting to the public 
about employers who have committed wage theft. The location for 
sharing such information varies, from agency websites to notices posted 
at the employer’s place of business.114 
Only a small minority (10%) of the strategies involving penalties 
authorizes criminal charges against an employer. These laws define 
wage theft as a misdemeanor or felony with accompanying fines or jail 
time.115 Criminal liability frequently requires that the employer 
knowingly or intentionally engaged in wage theft.116 
                                                     
108. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 8-4-109 to 8-4-110 (2019) (providing that civil penalties are 
calculated with a “daily earnings” penalty for an employer’s failure to pay wages within fourteen 
days of demand and a 50% greater penalty for willful violations).  
109. See, e.g., 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/12 (West 2019) (providing that where an 
employer is found liable and acted willfully, repeatedly, or recklessly, that employer must pay up to 
20% of the wages owed to the employee to the agency). 
110. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 49.48.125(1) (2019) (increasing penalties for willful violators). 
111. See, e.g., ST. PETERSBURG, FLA., CODE §§ 15-42, 15-45(b) (2019) (including within civil 
penalties: attorney’s fees, costs, and costs to the city for the administrative cost of handling the 
complaint). 
112. See e.g., 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 175/70 (revoking day or temporary labor agency 
registration); OAKLAND, CAL., CODE § 5.92.050(F) (2019) (regarding approval of land use permits).  
113. See, e.g., BERKELEY, CAL., CODE § 13.99.090 (2019) (providing that “city agencies or 
departments may revoke or suspend any registration certificates, permits or licenses held or 
requested by the Employer . . .”). 
114. In New York, the agency can post information about employers who have committed an 
“egregious violation” of the wage theft law. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 219-c(3) (McKinney 2019). In San 
Francisco, the employer itself is required to post a notice if it fails to comply with an order to pay 
back wages or penalties. S.F., CAL., CODE § 12R.7(f) (2019). 
115. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 31-288, 31-69(a), 31-76(a) (2019) (providing that an 
employer’s failure to pay legally required or promised wages is a class D felony). 
116. See, e.g., D.C. CODE. ANN. § 32-1307(a) (West 2019) (requiring negligent or willful 
conduct); DENVER, CO, CODE § 38-51.8 (2019) (requiring knowing conduct). 
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Lien penalties authorize the filing of a lien or levy against the 
employer’s property for wages or penalties owed.117 Only a handful of 
the strategies involving penalties (5%) authorize a lien against their 
personal or real property. 
Bond penalties require employers to post a bond (4%). Such bonds 
may be required for all employers in high-risk industries who must 
obtain specialized licensing or more specifically as penalties for 
employers who have committed wage theft.118 
4. Expanded Liability 
A small minority (19%) of the laws examined contain strategies to 
expand the number of employers ultimately liable for unpaid wages. Of 




Expanded Liability Strategies 
 
38% Broader Definition of Employer 
34% Successor Liability 
28% Joint and Several Liability 
 
Expanded liability strategies seek to address challenges of regulating 
the fissured workplace and authorize workers to seek their wages from 
multiple joint employers.119 More than one third (38%) hold entities 
directly liable for a worker’s wages if they “use” or “subcontract” the 
services of that worker’s direct employer.120 Another third (34%) permit 
employees of companies that have either dissolved or disappeared to 
hold successor entities with a similar operation liable for wage theft.121 
                                                     
117. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 3-1101 to 3-1110 (West 2019) (authorizes a 
lien for unpaid wages).  
118. See, e.g., BERKELEY, CAL., CODE § 13.104.060 (2019) (authorizing city to require a bond 
before providing a certificate of occupancy for construction projects). 
119. Employers are joint employers when both employers employ the employee, making both 
jointly and severally liable for the payment of wages. 
120. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 658.415 (2019) (stating that “[a]ny person who uses the services 
of a labor contractor” can be held “personally and jointly and severally liable” for the wages of the 
contractor’s workers). In California, general contractors are liable for nonpayment of wages by 
subcontractors, but not for penalties and liquidated damages. CAL. LAB. CODE § 218.7 (West 2019). 
121. See, e.g., L.A. COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 8.101.050 (2019) (creating successor liability where, 
at the time of the conveyance of the business, the successor had knowledge of the wage theft and the 
amount of the Wage Enforcement Order). 
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Finally, more than a quarter (28%) authorize administrative agencies or 
courts more generally to find joint and several liability among multiple 
employers.122 
5. Information Requirements 
Half (50%) of the laws regulate information in an effort to increase 
awareness about wage and hour laws or to enhance transparency 
regarding an employer’s payment of wages. Of these laws, the 





23% Mandatory Disclosures 
21% Employer Recordkeeping 
19% Posters 
12% Burden Shifting for Lack of Records 
10% Agency Data Collection or Reporting 
10% Worker Education 
4% Employer Education 
 
Slightly less than half (42%) of the information strategies require 
employers to make disclosures to workers. Less than a quarter (23%) of 
these disclosures require employers to make extensive mandatory 
disclosures directly to workers at the time of hire. These disclosures 
include the employee’s specific pay rate and hours worked each pay 
period, the employer’s name and address, or instructions on how to file 
an administrative wage complaint.123 Similarly, about a fifth (19%) of 
information strategies require that employers display a poster at the 
worksite about the rights of workers under the anti-wage theft law.124 A 
good portion of these posting requirements specify that information must 
be provided in languages other than English.125 Under some laws, the 
                                                     
122. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 96.8, 98, 238.1–238.5, 538.1 (West 2019) (creating joint 
liability for entities who contract for service in the property services and long-term care industries). 
123. See, e.g., SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 14.20.025(D) (2019) (requiring employers to 
disclose information about the employer and payment of wages at the time of hire); OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 658.440(1)(f) (2019) (contractor must provide information about the job upon hire). 
124. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 448.109 (2019) (requiring employers to hang posters in the 
workplace regarding employees’ minimum wage rights). 
125. See, e.g., FLAGSTAFF, ARIZ., CODE § 15-01-001-0004(A) (2019) (requiring postings in English, 
Spanish, and any language spoken by at least 5% of the employees at the workplace or job site).  
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failure of employers to post or provide information to workers subjects 
employers to a penalty.126 
A little more than a fifth (21%) of information strategies create or 
enhance employers’ recordkeeping requirements. In particular, 
employers are required to record and retain information, such as 
employees’ hours, pay rates, and pay, and may be penalized for failing 
to do so.127 A smaller percentage (12%) of these strategies shift the 
burden to the employer for proving the proper payment of wages when 
the employer fails to maintain or provide access to required records.128 
A small percentage (10%) of information strategies require state or 
local agencies to either report about their enforcement system (such as 
the occurrences of wage theft or implementation of the anti-wage theft 
law by the agency) or collect information directly from employers about 
their payroll.129 A similarly small portion of information strategies direct 
state and local agencies to educate workers (10%) or employers (4%).130 
III. LIMITATIONS OF COMMON ANTI-WAGE THEFT 
STRATEGIES 
Given the incredible momentum that exists to change state and local 
policies to address wage theft and the seriousness of the problem, it is 
critical to examine whether the anti-wage theft strategies being advanced 
by these laws are likely to succeed. Using the above typology, this Part 
examines the underlying assumptions of how the anti-wage theft 
strategies are supposed to operate in practice. Many of the most common 
anti-wage theft strategies resemble popular, but failed, regulatory 
strategies in other contexts, such as rights claiming, command and 
control enforcement, and information disclosure. This Article concludes 
that such strategies are unlikely to significantly reduce wage theft. At the 
same time, we note several less common anti-wage theft strategies that 
may be more successful in directly addressing some of the problematic 
assumptions in popular regulatory strategies. 
                                                     
126. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-364(F) (2019) (mandating penalty for failure to 
comply with recordkeeping or posting requirements). 
127. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. §§ 652.409, 652.610, 652.750 (2019) (requiring employers to 
maintain time and pay records for three years after an employee’s termination). 
128. See, e.g., BROWARD COUNTY, FLA., ORDINANCE 2018-36, ch. 20½, § 20½-4(c)(6) (2019) 
(shifting the burden of proof onto the employer when the employer fails to maintain payroll records). 
129. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 658.405 (2019) (requiring employers to submit certified copies 
of payroll records).  
130. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 190(O) (West 2019) (requiring education of 
domestic workers and their employers, including distribution of model employment agreements).  
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A. Rights-Claiming Strategies 
Less than half (40%) of the 141 laws surveyed either provide workers 
with the ability to file a complaint with an administrative agency or the 
courts or facilitate the filing of such complaints by extending or tolling 
the statute of limitations. Despite the popular notion that people litigate 
too readily, most do not pursue legal grievances.131 Sociolegal scholars 
have extensively studied rights-claiming strategies and have argued that 
whether an individual files a complaint “depend[s] on the individual’s 
location in the social hierarchy,” with members from more marginalized 
groups less likely to seek remedy through the legal system.132 Similarly, 
the strategy of worker complaints is questionable because it relies on the 
assumption that workers, including immigrant workers,133 will file wage 
theft complaints. 
Any regulatory strategy premised on worker complaints assumes that 
aggrieved parties will engage in the “naming, blaming, [and] 
claiming.”134 Tangible traits such as income, education, and knowledge 
of the legal system shape whether individuals view their injury as a legal 
grievance and decide to take legal action to resolve the problem.135 In 
examining the right of individuals to bring a claim under Title VII, 
scholars have found a “widespread failure to confront discrimination 
publicly[,] . . . driven largely by an accurate perception that the costs of 
such responses will likely outweigh the benefits.”136 Empirical studies 
have revealed, for example, that less than 1% of African Americans who 
reported having suffered race-based discrimination at work filed a 
complaint with the EEOC.137 Such Title VII studies have led some to 
conclude that the complaint-based model for civil rights enforcement has 
largely failed.138 
                                                     
131. Wofford, supra note 11, at 967.  
132. Id. at 968. 
133. See Kati L. Griffith & Shannon M. Gleeson, The Precarity of Temporality: How Law 
Inhibits Immigrant Worker Claims, 39 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 111, 118–20 (2017). 
134. Felstiner, Abel & Sarat, supra note 8, at 631. 
135. Wofford, supra note 11, at 967–68. 
136. Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as a Rights-Claiming 
System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859, 900 (2008). 
137. Laura Beth Neilsen & Robert L. Nelson, Rights Realized? An Empirical Analysis of 
Employment Discrimination Litigation as a Claiming System, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 663, 704–05 (2005). 
138. See Michael Waterstone, A New Vision of Public Enforcement, 92 MINN. L. REV. 434, 447 
(2007). 
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In the context of wage-related laws, scholars and advocates have 
similarly critiqued the strategy of worker complaints.139 It is hard to get 
workers to “name” wage theft because they often do not understand that 
it is happening.140 This “naming” assumption has been powerfully 
questioned by Charlotte Alexander and Arthi Prasad in their analysis of 
the data from the Broken Laws study.141 They found that only one third 
of low-wage workers identified having a wage problem while higher 
rates of them were found to actually have a wage theft problem (26% 
had not been paid minimum wage and 76% were owed overtime).142 In 
general, over half of these workers (59%) did not know their minimum 
wage or overtime rights.143 The low-wage workforce faces particular 
challenges given the higher incidence of individuals who may not be 
familiar with U.S. laws or lack high levels of education.144 
Understanding whether wage theft has occurred is often complex. For 
example, a worker may not readily understand whether they should have 
been paid for time spent taking ten-minute breaks at work or whether 
they received the proper rate of overtime pay when paid a daily or 
weekly rate.145 Due to rampant misclassification, a worker may also be 
misclassified as an independent contractor—incorrectly believing they 
are not entitled to the protections of the wage and hour laws afforded to 
                                                     
139.  See KOONZE ET AL., supra note 79, at 12–13; DIEGO RONDÓN ICHIKAWA & REBECCA 
SMITH, DELIVERING $15: COMMUNITY-CENTERED WAGE AND HOUR ENFORCEMENT IN SEATTLE 4–
7 (2014); Janice Fine, Solving the Problem from Hell: Tripartism as a Strategy for Addressing 
Labour Standards Non-Compliance in the United States, 50 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 813, 820–21 
(2013); David Weil, A Strategic Approach to Labour Inspection, 147 INT’L LAB. REV. 349, 356 
(2008) [hereinafter Weil, A Strategic Approach to Labour Inspection]. 
140. Alexander & Prasad, supra note 8, at 1085. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. at 1093 (citing other studies showing lack of knowledge about the law). 
144. Id. at 1088 (finding for every year of education a worker was more likely to have identified a 
workplace problem); see also GREGORY ACS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, A PROFILE OF LOW WAGE 
WORKERS 5–6 tbl.6 (1999) (showing that in 1997, only 35.5% of low-wage workers and 28.5% of 
low-wage/low-income workers had more than twelve years of schooling). 
145. A worker, for example, can be paid on a piece rate basis of $100 per day, six days per week, 
for a total of $600. The worker might fairly believe that she is getting more than minimum wage 
($7.25/hour x 40 hours = $290) and overtime ($10.88/hour x 20 hours = $217.60), which is 
incorrect. In fact, she is not receiving overtime as her overtime wages would be calculated by first 
establishing her regular rate of pay of $10 ($600 / 60 hours = $10/hour) and requiring the employer 
to pay the overtime premium for hours worked over forty ($15/hour x 20 hours = $300). Layered on 
top of this analysis is the threshold question of whether the worker’s job places her in a statutory 
category where she is, in fact, eligible for overtime. 
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employees.146 It is unsurprising, therefore, that workers have a hard time 
identifying wage theft. 
Even presuming that workers recognize that wage theft is occurring, 
they may struggle with “blaming” the correct employers.147 There are 
several practical barriers that arise. The fissured workplace makes it 
harder for workers to blame the correct parties responsible for their wage 
theft.148 Workers may not even know exactly for whom they work, much 
less be aware of entities at the top of the supply chain.149 A study of 
temporary staffing workers found that they sometimes lacked key 
information about their employers, such as the names of the staffing 
agency or the host employer.150 Some jobs, such as those involving day 
labor, are particularly informal, with workers being picked up on a street 
corner or from a parking lot to work for several hours or days.151 In these 
situations, aggrieved workers may not have the information needed to 
assign blame to the contractor that picked them up, much less the larger 
entity that used the contractor for the project.152 With respect to fly-by-
night employers, it may be difficult for workers to uncover the existence 
of the new successor entity at a new location that comprises essentially 
the same employer.153 Some workers may recognize wage theft but are 
reluctant to blame their employer because of personal loyalty or belief 
that it is one of the inevitable costs of being undocumented.154 
                                                     
146. See, e.g., LINDA H. DONAHUE, JAMES RYAN LAMARE & FRED B. KOTLER, CORNELL UNIV. 
ILR SCH., THE COST OF WORKER MISCLASSIFICATION IN NEW YORK STATE 4–5 tbls.1–7 (2007) 
(providing the extent of worker misclassification in New York State based on audits). 
147. Felstiner, Abel & Sarat, supra note 8, at 635–36. 
148. COOPER & KROEGER, supra note 5, at 4 (explaining that “unscrupulous employers” will 
often use the “‘fissured’ nature” of the employer-employee relationship to avoid responsibility when 
those employees wish to bring claims regarding mistreatment). 
149. Thomas E. Perez, The Fair Labor Standards Act at Seventy-Seven: Still “Far-Reaching, 
Far-Sighted”, 30 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 299, 303 (2015). 
150. REBECCA DAILY, TRACIE JOHNSON & HOLLY SMITH, SHELLER CENTER FOR SOCIAL 
JUSTICE, PENNSYLVANIA WORKERS IN JEOPARDY: THE HIDDEN PROBLEM OF TEMPORARY 
EMPLOYMENT 19–20 (2017). 
151. Stephen Franklin, A Day in the Life of a Day Laborer, IN THESE TIMES (June 15, 2017, 3:41 
PM), http://inthesetimes.com/working/entry/20237/day_laborer_purgatory_waiting_in_the_streets 
_to_take_a_backbreaking_job [https://perma.cc/AMC6-N7DS] (illustrating how a group of day 
laborers will wait on a street corner for contractors to hire them, often working for those contractors 
for little to no money and fearing the sometimes-dangerous working conditions).  
152. IMMIGRATION & WORKER’S RIGHTS CLINIC, SETON HALL UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, IRONBOUND 
UNDERGROUND: WAGE THEFT & WORKPLACE VIOLATIONS AMONG DAY LABORERS IN NEWARK’S 
EAST WARD 11 (2010).  
153. CHO ET AL., supra note 58, at 10. 
154. Email from Keith Talbot, Senior Counsel, Legal Servs. of N.J. (Dec. 26, 2018, 15:51 CST) 
(on file with authors). 
09 - Lee & Smith.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/30/2019  10:38 AM 
2019] REGULATING WAGE THEFT 787 
 
At the “claiming” stage, unpaid workers do not readily complain. A 
study by David Weil and Amanda Pyles, which reviewed data from the 
DOL, Wage and Hour Division from 2001 to 2004, found an abysmally 
low number of workers complained to DOL about wage and hour 
violations: approximately 25 out of 100,000 workers.155 Alexander and 
Prasad also present evidence that low-wage workers are not likely to 
complain for a variety of reasons. Of the workers who recognized the 
problem of wage theft in the Broken Laws study, only 57% complained, 
with nearly all those filing complaints directly with the employer.156 
Only 4% of those who complained opted to do so to the government or 
file a lawsuit, with 77% unaware of how to complain to the 
government.157 Those who knew how to complain chose not to do so 
because they doubted the efficacy of taking action, did not want to take 
the time to engage in a lengthy process, and feared retaliation.158 
Increased use of forced arbitration as a condition of employment has 
created yet another barrier to workers’ enforcement of their wage-related 
rights and undermines worker complaint strategies.159 
Although nearly half of worker complaint strategies involved creating 
a private right of action, workers cannot readily bring claims pro se and 
do not have ready access to attorneys.160 Workers may incorrectly 
believe that they must have a lawyer to file suit, feel ill-equipped to fill 
out the required paperwork and comply with court rules, or simply lack 
the time to take legal action.161 They also face incredible barriers to 
obtaining an attorney, particularly for representation regarding smaller 
wage claims.162 Nonprofit attorneys are constrained by limited resources 
and private attorneys are constrained because they need to generate 
                                                     
155. Weil & Pyles, supra note 8, at 70 tbl.1. 
156. Alexander & Prasad, supra note 8, at 1089. 
157. Id. at 1095. 
158. Id. at 1089; SAN DIEGO STATE UNIV. DEP’T OF SOC. ET AL., supra note 68, at 7–9; 
SHANNON GLEESON, PRECARIOUS CLAIMS: THE PROMISE AND FAILURE OF WORKPLACE 
PROTECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 14–15 (2016) [hereinafter GLEESON, PRECARIOUS CLAIMS]. 
159. See generally Nantiya Ruan, What’s Left to Remedy Wage Theft? How Arbitration Mandates 
That Bar Class Actions Impact Low-Wage Workers, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1103 (describing the 
pervasiveness of arbitration mandates in employment relationships, the limits they place on wage 
related rights, including the right to engage in aggregate claims, and the negative impact on low-
wage workers). Forced arbitration provisions can also decrease the statute of limitations period to 
bring a wage claim. See Imre S. Szalai, The Failure of Legal Ethics to Address the Abuses of Forced 
Arbitration, 24 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 127, 142–43 (2018).  
160. See GLEESON, PRECARIOUS CLAIMS, supra note 158, at 95. 
161. See, e.g., Ruan, supra note 159, at 1118–19 (discussing the challenges of bringing legal 
action to recover “small” wage claims).  
162. Id. 
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fees.163 Workers may not have the freedom to take time off of work to 
visit an attorney during regular office hours or to testify in court.164 
There may also be language barriers that restrict a worker’s ability to 
communicate with would-be lawyers or to represent herself.165 Although 
there are no studies about the frequency with which workers use the 
private right of action under the anti-wage laws, one study shows that 
when collective or class action lawsuits are already initiated, workers at 
the same workplace who are eligible to opt in as plaintiffs do so at an 
incredibly low rate.166 Even where unpaid workers overcome these 
significant barriers and prevail against employers, the difficulty of 
actually collecting judgments is pervasive.167 
Finally, worker complaints prevent agencies from focusing resources 
on the worst employers. Weil and Pyles found that the industries in 
which workers filed complaints were not those with the highest 
violations.168 By examining complaints and compliance under the Fair 
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and Occupational Safety and Health Act 
(OSHA), they found that the complaints filed were imperfectly related to 
underlying problems or unrelated to industry-level conditions.169 Worker 
complaints are also problematic because they are inherently reactive, 
failing to send clear deterrence signals to the employers most deserving 
of regulatory scrutiny.170 
The anti-wage theft strategy of worker complaints is not, however, 
entirely useless. As a matter of increased access to justice, it provides 
                                                     
163. Id.; see also Effective Strategies and Tools for Wage Enforcement: Hearing Before the 
Oregon S. Interim Comm. on Workforce & Gen. Gov’t, 2016 Leg., 78th Sess. 4–5 (Or. 2016) 
(testimony of Laura Huizar, Staff Att’y, Nat’l Emp. L. Project) [hereinafter Effective Strategies and 
Tools for Wage Enforcement]; JACOB MEYER & ROBERT GREENLEAF, ENFORCEMENT OF STATE 
WAGE AND HOUR LAWS: A SURVEY OF STATE REGULATORS 10 (2011); NAT’L EMP’T LAW 
PROJECT, supra note 55, at 31. 
164.  See David Villano, Work-Life Balance Benefits Low-Wage Workers, Employers, PAC. 
STANDARD (June 14, 2017), https://psmag.com/economics/work-life-balance-benefits-low-wage-
workers-employers-35733 [https://perma.cc/2KQQ-AZ8U] (explaining that low-wage workers are 
frequently replaced—with employee turnover rates in some low-paying jobs in excess of 80%—
when they take time off for personal needs). 
165. See Sudha Shetty, Equal Justice Under the Law: Myth or Reality for Immigrants and 
Refugees?, 2 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 565, 565–66 (2004); Annette Wong, A Matter of Competence: 
Lawyers, Courts, and Failing to Translate Linguistic and Cultural Differences, 21 S. CAL. REV. L. 
& SOC. JUST. 431, 440–41 (2012). 
166. Charlotte S. Alexander, Would an Opt-In Requirement Fix the Class Action Settlement? 
Evidence from the Fair Labor Standards Act, 80 MISS. L.J. 443, 446–47 (2010). 
167. See, e.g., CHO ET AL., supra note 58, at 13 (describing how “under the current system in 
California, workers are left largely on their own to collect in the hardest cases”). 
168. Weil & Pyles, supra note 8, at 72–73. 
169. Weil, A Strategic Approach to Labour Inspection, supra note 139, at 359. 
170. Id. at 356, 359–61. 
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individual workers with a possible way to obtain redress for lost wages. 
In particular, the administrative complaint mechanism aims to increase 
access to justice because it is usually designed for pro se workers. The 
strategy of extending or tolling the statute of limitations can further help 
workers who may have either failed to timely recognize that they were 
victims of wage theft or had their administrative complaints languish 
with agencies. Further, a handful of laws try to overcome the “naming, 
blaming, and claiming” problem by: (1) authorizing coworkers, 
individuals, or organizations to come forward on behalf of the aggrieved 
worker; (2) notifying the employer’s current employees about an 
ongoing investigation; and (3) contracting with community-based 
organizations to assist workers with filing complaints.171 Anti-wage theft 
and rights-claiming strategies, therefore, serve some legitimate purposes 
but are questionable as overall strategies for significantly reducing wage 
theft. 
B. Protecting Workers from Retaliation 
Nearly half of the anti-wage theft laws passed included anti-
retaliation provisions. Retaliation in low-wage workplaces is common 
and “creates a culture of hopelessness and helplessness” that pervades 
the workplace.172 Most workers who choose to speak up or file 
complaints about wage theft will want to know that they can do so 
without experiencing retaliation or that they have the ability to obtain 
reinstatement or compensation if retaliation occurs.173 
Most anti-retaliation strategies involve prohibiting retaliation against 
workers who voice or file complaints and punishing employers who 
retaliate.174 The problem with such strategies is that they fail to 
encourage workers to step forward because the anti-retaliation protection 
triggers only after the employer has engaged in the harmful act of 
retaliation. For an individual worker who is weighing the option of 
complaining, the idea that an employer may be punished at some later 
                                                     
171. See, e.g., BROWARD COUNTY, FLA., ORDINANCE 2018-36, ch. 20½, § 20½-4(a)(2)(B) (2019) 
(authorizing membership-based entities to be the complainant); L.A., CAL., CODE § 8.101.090(G) 
(2019) (contracting with community-based organizations); ST. PETERSBURG, FLA., CODE § 15-
43(a)(1) (2019) (allowing any person or entity to help file complaints). 
172. BRITTANY SCOTT, RAISE THE FLOOR ALLIANCE & NAT’L ECON. & SOC. RTS. INITIATIVE, 
CHALLENGING THE BUSINESS OF FEAR 17 (2016) [hereinafter CHALLENGING THE BUSINESS OF 
FEAR]; see also supra notes 62–64. 
173. Id. at 28. 
174. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 342a, 345, 347–348, 397 (2019) (prohibiting retaliation 
and providing that an employee may bring a private action for retaliation). 
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point for having engaged in retaliation is often not helpful.175 Even if a 
court or agency eventually finds that the employer violated an anti-
retaliation law and orders back pay damages or reinstatement, it will 
likely take months or years to arrive at that decision.176 Further, available 
studies suggest that penalties for retaliation are rarely imposed.177 Low-
wage workers too frequently lack the savings necessary to be able to 
cover their expenses should they unexpectedly lose their jobs.178 They 
will also likely want assurance of a positive reference if they might be 
forced to seek another job.179 
Additionally, proving retaliation can be very difficult.180 There is 
usually no definitive proof that the action of the employer was taken as a 
result of a worker complaint.181 Most employment is “at will,” and thus, 
employers can fire workers for any non-discriminatory reason.182 Of the 
laws that include anti-retaliation provisions, only a minority (22%) seek 
to address this problem of proof by either shifting the burden to the 
employer of proving a non-retaliatory motive or by simply prohibiting 
termination within a certain period of time absent good cause. 
In particular, the strategy of prohibiting retaliation fails to provide 
undocumented workers with a meaningful remedy against employer 
retaliation and puts them at risk of further and potentially irrevocable 
harm, including detention and deportation. Undocumented workers are 
generally entitled to the protections of the anti-wage theft laws.183 
                                                     
175. Email from Patricia Kakalec, Att’y, Kakalec Law (Dec. 13, 2018, 13:35 CST) (on file with 
authors).  
176. SAN DIEGO STATE, supra note 68, at 9. 
177. See, e.g., id.; CHALLENGING THE BUSINESS OF FEAR, supra note 172, at 26. 
178. Hallett, supra note 9, at 104. 
179. Ruan, supra note 159, at 1120 (stating that many workers will not bring legal actions against 
their employer out of fear that they will be blacklisted or unable to obtain a positive job reference).   
180. CHALLENGING THE BUSINESS OF FEAR, supra note 172, at 25–26. 
181. Id. at 23; see also Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of 
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 420 (2004) (describing the 
difficulty of an after-the-fact enforcement mechanism to address the more complex and subtle 
discriminatory practices in the workplace) [hereinafter Lobel, The Renew Deal].  
182. Benjamin Means & Joseph A. Seiner, Navigating the Uber Economy, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1511, 1518–24 (2016). 
183. See, e.g., Lucas v. Jerusalem Cafe, LLC, 721 F.3d 927, 933 (8th Cir. 2013) (holding that 
undocumented workers could collect unpaid or underpaid wages under the FLSA); Patel v. Quality 
Inn S., 846 F.2d 700, 705–06 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that undocumented workers are entitled to 
wages for work performed under the FLSA). However, undocumented workers are not necessarily 
entitled to all available remedies if they experience retaliation, including reinstatement or back pay 
for the period when they were unemployed. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 
137, 148–50 (2002); Hernandez-Cortez v. Hernandez, No. Civ.A. 01-1241-JTM, 2003 WL 
22519678, at *7 (D. Kan. Nov. 4, 2003); Veliz v. Rental Serv. Corp. USA, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 2d 
1317, 1336–37 (M.D. Fla. 2003). 
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Complaining workers who lack status may be detained and deported.184 
Courts have even recognized that reporting undocumented workers to 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is a form of illegal 
retaliation.185 However, those same courts, when adjudicating wage 
claims, are largely powerless to protect workers if they are detained and 
deported.186 In an era of high-profile workplace immigration 
enforcement actions,187 therefore, undocumented workers and their 
concerned co-workers may be more reluctant than ever to come forward 
with claims of wage theft. 
Further, it is questionable whether prohibiting retaliation on-the-
books will actually encourage employers to stop retaliating. In the 
context of anti-retaliation protections for whistleblowers, the empirical 
evidence demonstrates that, despite the statutory protections available, 
there is “continuing retaliation against whistleblowers.”188 Once it 
occurs, retaliation frequently impacts not only the individual worker, but 
the entire workplace.189 In the context of low-wage workers, employers 
engage in rampant retaliation.190 As discussed more fully in the 
following Section, there are multiple reasons why employers do not 
                                                     
184. REBECCA SMITH & EUNICE HYUNHYE CHO, NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, WORKERS’ 
RIGHTS ON ICE: HOW IMMIGRATION REFORM CAN STOP RETALIATION AND ADVANCE LABOR 
RIGHTS 4 (2013), https://www.nelp.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Workers-Rights-on-ICE-
Retaliation-Report-California.pdf [https://perma.cc/B3LU-BE8T]. 
185. See Rivera v. Nibco, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1065 (9th Cir. 2004); Singh v. Jutla & C.D. & R’s 
Oil, Inc., 214 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1059 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Does I Thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile 
Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1071–73 (9th Cir. 2000); In re Reyes, 814 F.2d 168, 170 (5th Cir. 1987); 
Contreras v. Corinthian Vigor Ins. Brokerage, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1058–59 (N.D. Cal. 1998). 
186. Courts may be in a position to provide certification for certain kinds of victim visas but only 
under circumstances where the actions rise to the level of criminal activity. See, e.g., Garcia v. 
Audobon Comtys. Mgmt., LLC, No. 08-cv-01291, slip op. at 7 (E.D. La. Apr. 15, 2008) (granting U 
visa certifications to undocumented plaintiffs based on their status as victims of criminal 
exploitation). 
187. See Andrew Selsky, Activist: Immigration Officers Detain 10 Workers in Oregon, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 28, 2017), 
https://apnews.com/88fd12ab02124e17968a8068bc85a3dd/Activist:-Immigration-officers-detain-
10-workers-in-Oregon [https://perma.cc/9XWM-D4SR]; Michael Matza, After ICE Raid at Chesco 
Mushroom Farm, Anxiety High Among Immigrant Workers, INQUIRER (May 7, 2017), 
https://www.philly.com/philly/news/ice-raid-mushroom-fear-deport-chester-county.html 
[https://perma.cc/6A5H-AAT4]; John Burnett & Marisa Peñaloza, How Kitchen Raids in Buffalo 
Sent Shock Waves Through Immigrant Rights Community, NPR (Jan. 8, 2017, 8:35 AM), 
http://www.npr.org/2017/01/08/508548698/how-kitchen-raids-in-buffalo-sent-shock-waves-
through-immigrant-rights-community [https://perma.cc/E7MR-88CU]. 
188. Elizabeth C. Tippett, The Promise of Compelled Whistleblowing: What the Corporate 
Governance Provisions of Sarbanes Oxley Mean for Employment Law, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y 
J. 1, 16–17 (2007). 
189. See CHALLENGING THE BUSINESS OF FEAR, supra note 172, at 15. 
190. See id. at 13; BERNHARDT ET AL., BROKEN LAWS, supra note 38, at 3. 
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obey the law that applies equally to this context of anti-retaliation 
strategies.191 
Finally, this strategy fails to address what has been referred to as 
“anticipatory retaliation”—an employer’s ability to engage in retaliatory 
acts made in anticipation of future employee action.192 For example, an 
employer who wants to discourage underpaid workers from filing a 
lawsuit might tell them that he fired the last worker who tried to take her 
to court. Alternatively, in response to rumors about workers frustrated by 
wage theft occurring at their workplace, an employer might 
preemptively cut the hours of those workers he thinks are most likely to 
take legal action. This form of employer control appears to be highly 
effective at deterring workers, particularly low-wage workers, from 
enforcing their rights.193 Despite that, the anti-retaliation prohibitions 
generally fail to directly address anticipatory retaliation. Rather, they 
purport to protect an employee from retaliation once the worker has 
already taken certain steps to enforce their wage-related rights.194 
While the strategy of prohibiting retaliation has challenges, it does 
offer the possibility of concrete relief for those workers who do come 
forward. In addition to the innovations of a burden-shifting regime, there 
are several other innovations that seek to broaden the scope of their 
protections. A small number of laws expand what is traditionally 
considered protected activity to include, for example, educating others 
about their wage-related rights and making informal complaints to the 
employer.195 Some laws further expand the scope of coverage by 
protecting those who help others to enforce their rights and prohibiting 
retaliatory conduct by anyone, not just the employer.196 
Only a minority of the anti-retaliation strategies (24%) permit 
workers to file confidential complaints to encourage workers to come 
                                                     
191. See Tippett, supra note 188, at 19–20 (noting that even if top management follows the law, 
supervisory personnel or coworkers may engage in retaliation); infra Section III.C. 
192. Charlotte S. Alexander, Anticipatory Retaliation, Threats, and The Silencing of the Brown 
Collar Workforce, 50 AM. BUS. L.J. 779, 780–81 (2013). 
193. Id. at 781, 785. 
194. See, e.g., LAS MILIPITAS, CAL., CODE § III-31-8.00 (2019) (prohibiting retaliation for 
exercising rights under the law, including filing a complaint, informing others about their rights, or 
helping them to assert those rights). 
195. See, e.g., id. (protecting both those who file complaints and those who inform workers of 
their rights); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-364(B) (2019) (protecting those who complain, inform 
others of their rights, or assist others to file a complaint). 
196. See, e.g., MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE § 40.440 (2019) (prohibiting retaliation by “an 
employer or any other person”). 
09 - Lee & Smith.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/30/2019  10:38 AM 
2019] REGULATING WAGE THEFT 793 
 
forward. Workers have expressed strong interest in this innovation.197 A 
number of the confidentiality provisions, however, have limitations—
some provide for the eventual disclosure of worker information in the 
later stages of the complaint process,198 while others only permit 
disclosure with the worker’s advance consent.199 Even if agencies have 
no intention of disclosing the name of complainants, workers may still 
fear having such complaints traced back to them.200 For example, 
workers in small workplaces or unique circumstances may be readily 
identified by the employer regardless of whether confidential complaints 
are permitted. Whether confidentiality provisions actually encourage 
worker action and deter retaliation are subjects for future research. 
C. Enforcing Penalties 
More than three-quarters of the anti-wage theft laws involve the 
strategy of penalties. Such penalties include civil penalties (to the wage 
theft victim or the government), criminal prosecution, business or other 
license revocation, filing of liens or levies, negative publicity, and the 
requirement of bonds.201 Penalties are problematic because they rely on 
command and control strategies that are often ineffective at changing the 
behavior of the regulated entities.202 Without a sufficient threat of real 
enforcement that will cost the employer, penalties will fail to create real 
deterrence.203 Rigidly setting one-size-fits-all standards backed up by 
penalties can also fail to take into account how employers’ conduct can 
deviate from the ways in which economic models expect the rational 
actor to behave.204 These concepts lead us to question whether the 
                                                     
197. CHALLENGING THE BUSINESS OF FEAR, supra note 172, at 35 (finding that 79% of workers 
surveyed wanted an anonymous way to report workplace problems to the government). 
198. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-4-220(c) (2019) (“The name of any employee identified in a 
claim shall be kept confidential until the director issues an administrative complaint or the director 
is ordered to release the information by order of a court of competent jurisdiction.”). 
199. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-364(C) (2019) (“The name of any employee 
identified in a complaint to the commission shall be kept confidential as long as possible. Where the 
commission determines that an employee’s name must be disclosed in order to investigate a 
complaint further, it may so do only with the employee’s consent.”).  
200. KEVIN BANKS, EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS COMPLAINT RESOLUTION, COMPLIANCE AND 
ENFORCEMENT: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON ACCESS AND EFFECTIVENESS 35 (2016). 
201. See supra Section II.B.3. 
202. See Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative Compliance 
in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 305 (1999); Solomon, supra note 12, at 822; 
Waterstone, supra note 138, at 487–88. 
203. Lobel, Interlocking Regulatory, supra note 12, at 1097–98. 
204. Employers may be influenced by something other than the rational calculus of the risks of 
law breaking versus the likelihood of punishment. Norms, for example, influence regulated parties. 
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strategy of enhancing penalties on the books will prove successful in 
obtaining compliance from employers, thereby reducing wage theft. 
Increasing penalties may do little to impact employer behavior in the 
absence of robust enforcement. In a study of the minimum wage law, 
Orley Ashenfelter and Daniel Smith argued that the rational employer 
would assess the benefits and costs of complying with the law based on 
the likelihood of an investigation together with the costs of penalties.205 
Studies in other contexts, however, suggest that the probability of 
detection plays an even greater role in deterring law-breaking than the 
severity of punishment.206 For example, in the criminal context, solely 
enhancing sanctions does not result in more successfully deterring 
crime.207 “Deterrence falls off rapidly (and nonlinearly) with lower 
probabilities of enforcement, and higher penalties are insufficient to 
counteract these losses.”208 A lack of consistent enforcement may alter 
the social norms associated with illegal activity, such as wage theft, 
where individuals decide to take a chance at evading detection and 
paying sub-minimum wages.209 This lack of consistent and rigorous 
enforcement may also build the image of a failed agency, which 
undercuts its reputation and credibility to act effectively against errant 
operators.210 While one study found some correlation between increasing 
penalties and decreasing minimum wage violations, it acknowledged 
that it did not take into account the corresponding role of other kinds of 
enforcement that would also address wage and hour violations.211 Other 
                                                     
Farber, supra note 202, at 320. See generally Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 181, at 448 
(“Drawing on psychological analysis, behavioral law and economics has introduced the 
understanding that individual preferences are endogenous, a function of experience and existing 
collective norms.”). 
205. See Orley Ashenfelter & Robert S. Smith, Compliance with the Minimum Wage Law, 87 J. 
POL. ECON. 333, 335–36 (1979). 
206. Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 380 
(1997). 
207. Anthony N. Doob & Cheryl Marie Webster, Sentence Severity and Crime: Accepting the 
Null Hypothesis, 30 CRIME & JUST. 143, 189 (2003). 
208. Edward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and the Puzzle of Regulating Behavior, 100 NW. U. L. 
REV. 655, 660 (2006) (footnotes omitted); see also Paul Robinson & John M. Darley, Does 
Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioural Science Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173, 183–
84 (2004). 
209. Cheng, supra note 208, at 661; Bert I. Huang, Shallow Signals, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2227, 
2237–38 (2013). 
210. BALDWIN ET AL., supra note 14, at 71. 
211. Galvin, supra note 9, at 341 (concluding that given one state’s increased penalties failing to 
lead to a decrease in minimum wage violations means that “treble damages are not, by themselves, 
sufficient to deter noncompliance with minimum wage laws; enforcement of the policy is critical as 
well”). 
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studies of workplace laws have found that inspections and the actual 
imposition of penalties are correlated with changing employer 
behavior.212 
One reason for inadequate enforcement of anti-wage theft strategies is 
simply insufficient agency resources. In the context of workplace 
enforcement, most agencies lack adequate staff.213 A few laws attempt to 
address this issue by having wage theft violators pay for the costs of 
enforcement or creating a self-funding mechanism through the collection 
of penalties.214 Enforcement can take a lot of resources, for example, 
because employers can be hard to locate or non-responsive, particularly 
with fly-by-night and undercapitalized operations. Agencies may 
prematurely dismiss unpaid workers’ complaints or fail to conduct 
adequate investigations because they cannot follow-up with employers 
or do the in-depth investigations needed.215 Further, understaffed 
agencies often solely rely on worker complaints to trigger 
enforcement.216 As described in the worker complaints section, there are 
many reasons why such complaints are insufficient as the primary 
mechanism for driving enforcement. Jurisdictions, therefore, that rely 
either exclusively or heavily on worker complaints to trigger agency 
action will likely not see the robust enforcement needed to prevent 
employers from violating the law. 
Further, an agency’s lack of expertise or will to impose penalties may 
also cause inadequate enforcement. Certain agencies may tend to 
identify with employers because of agency capture or fail to have the 
expertise to enforce the anti-wage theft laws because they are not 
normally in the business of protecting workers.217 In particular, some 
                                                     
212. See, e.g., SYS. RESEARCH & APPLICATIONS CORP., REDUCING RECIDIVISM: EVALUATION OF 
GOALS, MEASURES, AND COMPLIANCE TOOLS, AND OPTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT 7 (2008) (finding 
imposition of civil monetary penalties by DOL in prior investigations is associated with reduced 
probability of noncompliance); Wayne B. Gray & John M. Mendeloff, The Declining Effects of 
OSHA Inspections on Manufacturing Injuries, 1979–1998, 58 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 571, 586 
(2005) (hypothesizing that no penalties imposed after an OSHA inspection provided a “clean bill of 
health,” which reduced attention by managers to safety issues). 
213. See MEYER & GREENLEAF, supra note 163, at 19–23; Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law 
of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 330 (2005) [hereinafter 
Estlund, Rebuilding]; Lurie, supra note 107, at 431–33. 
214. See, e.g., MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE § 40.410(b)(3) (2019) (providing for fines to include 
reimbursement to the agency for all appropriate costs expended in enforcing the law). 
215. Levine, supra note 26. 
216. MEYER & GREENLEAF, supra note 163, at 26. 
217. Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 
TEX. L. REV. 15, 22–23 (2010). Certain laws vest the authority to regulate in agencies that do not 
normally address workers. The Philadelphia Ordinance, for example, provides the authority to 
revoke or deny licenses to the Department of Licenses and Inspections (L&I). PHILA., PA., CODE 
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enhanced penalties involve enforcement by non-labor related agencies, 
such as police departments, district attorneys, and licensing divisions.218 
Despite the availability of criminal prosecution, for example, criminal 
penalties are rarely imposed because some local police or district 
attorneys may not view combatting wage theft as part of their job or may 
be reluctant to impose criminal charges against businesses.219 Where 
prosecutors are elected rather than appointed, they, too, may be reluctant 
to prosecute local businesses—particularly popular or influential ones—
fearing that such action will harm their chances of reelection.220 
In addition, the imposition of monetary penalties or liens may be 
compromised by the failure of agency officials or judges to investigate 
thoroughly, understand the facts, or use their authority to impose 
penalties. The mechanics of how wage theft occurs can raise complex 
factual questions, such as issues related to deductions, overtime, and tip 
pooling.221 If employer records are insufficient, these complex factual 
questions can take time to sort out and create barriers to completing an 
investigation. Agencies and courts also may not be aggressive in their 
use of penalties against employers and exercise discretion, as permitted 
by most laws, to waive or reduce the imposition of such penalties.222 In 
Arkansas, for example, the agency responsible for enforcing the state 
wage laws has had a policy of only imposing liquidated damages where 
the employer is a repeat violator—a requirement not included in the 
                                                     
§ 9-4308 (2019). This department lacks expertise about worker issues. Barkow, supra, at 19–20 
(discussing how agency independence requires expertise). 
218. Several jurisdictions have licensing revocation systems that do not provide for either a 
complaint or investigation mechanism. See, e.g., SOMERVILLE, MASS., CODE § 9-31 (2019) (lacking 
mechanism for filing complaints against particular employers); NEWARK, N.J., CODE §§ 8:32-2 to 
8:32-5 (2019) (omitting any information about a process for complaints about or investigation of 
employers). In the same vein, a few laws that criminalize wage theft do not specify any mechanism 
for how prosecutors will learn about wage theft.  
219. Hallett, supra note 9, at 135. But see Effective Strategies and Tools for Wage Enforcement, 
supra note 163 (discussing a few local jurisdictions that have robustly used criminal prosecution). 
California, in particular, has a different system where they have a separate Criminal Investigation 
Unit—with sworn police officers—within the Bureau of Field Enforcement. JULIE A. SU, DEP’T OF 
INDUS. RELATIONS, 2015–2016 FISCAL YEAR REPORT ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE BUREAU OF 
FIELD ENFORCEMENT 10–11 (2016). 
220. Immigrant workers too may fear going to a police department given the connection in some 
jurisdictions between local law enforcement and ICE. See, e.g., Stephen Lee, Policing Wage Theft 
in the Day Labor Market, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 655, 657–58 (2014) (discussing how immigrant 
communities may fear local law enforcement because of potential cooperation with federal 
immigration enforcement programs). 
221. See supra note 145. 
222. See Hallett, supra note 9, at 134; infra note 297; cf. NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, supra note 
4, at 19 (suggesting that the imposition of treble damages should be mandatory to avoid leaving 
discretion to the court or administrative agency about awarding damages). 
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law.223 Like prosecutors, agency officials may fear the negative political 
consequences, such as cuts in future agency funding from enforcing the 
law too vigorously against businesses.224 At the end of the day, 
therefore, agencies and courts may simply refuse to impose penalties. 
For penalties to create deterrence, employers must understand when 
their behavior is illegal.225 Some employers may not be aware that they 
are out of compliance. An employer may be understandably confused 
given the complexity of the law.226 While ignorance of the law is never 
an excuse, the reality is that large employers with human resources 
departments and access to legal counsel may readily understand how to 
act legally while less sophisticated employers may not. Further, the 
under-enforcement of laws creates “vagueness in practice,” because 
without concrete examples of enforcement against regulated entities, 
some employers may become confused about what, in fact, is an illegal 
activity.227 
Finally, employers may not act rationally in response to penalty 
strategies because they may be more strongly influenced by social 
norms. Multiple scholars have argued that the economic model of the 
rational choice actor does not capture how individuals may make 
irrational decisions.228 Even with some level of enforcement, individuals 
may engage in illegal activity based on heuristics that underestimate 
their chances of getting caught.229 Individuals and corporations are 
known to violate the law based on the “signal of noncompliant behavior 
by peers [which] is often taken as a cheap source of information (to put 
it charitably, a sort of vetting) about the degree of a law’s 
enforcement.”230 As certain industries predicate their business models on 
wage theft, therefore, an employer may intentionally or negligently 
                                                     
223. Ruan, supra note 159, at 1111 (providing that because the FLSA only allows for liquidated 
damages and no punitive damages, non-compliance is encouraged, as it is cheaper than the 
“expected costs of the mandated wage” (footnote omitted)). 
224. See Talbot, supra note 154 (stating that bureaucrats, including those involved in wage and 
hour enforcement, are impacted by the potential for negative political consequences). 
225. See Robinson & Darley, supra note 208, at 175–76. 
226. See supra note 145.  
227. Cheng, supra note 208, at 660. 
228. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law 
and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1476–77 (1988) (describing three different types of 
“bounds” on human behavior that “draw into question the central ideas of utility maximization, 
stable preferences, rational expectations, and optimal processing of information”); Kahan, supra 
note 206, at 350 (discussing how social influences can impact behavior of an individual in deciding 
whether to commit a crime). 
229. Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 228, at 1477–78. 
230. Huang, supra note 209, at 2231. 
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violate the law because it is the norm within the industry.231 Such norms 
can take precedence over what the law actually requires and shape 
employers’ decisions about wages and working conditions.232 
Non-civil penalties, such as criminal prosecution, license revocation, 
or posting of bonds, are roughly half of the available strategies for 
imposing penalties against employers.233 They do, however, present a 
way to up the ante against non-compliant employers by creating harsher 
consequences for wage theft. As discussed in the next Part, the effective 
use of penalty strategies will require agencies to depart from the rigid 
command and control model to a more flexible approach that considers 
the diversity of employers. 
D. Liability for Multiple Employers 
A small minority (19%) of the anti-wage theft laws uses the strategy 
of expanded liability. These strategies are designed to hold more than a 
single employer accountable for wage theft in order to address the 
fissured workplace or the disappearing or undercapitalized employer.234 
The more common strategy involves creating direct liability for multiple 
employers.235 Other strategies involve having the law more generally 
recognize “joint and several liability” among employers or authorizing 
the imposition of liability against successor entities.236 
These strategies are problematic to the extent that they rely on rights-
claiming strategies for correctly “blaming” the right employers. Given 
the fissured workplace, a worker’s ability to correctly blame their 
multiple employers can no longer be taken for granted.237 
For expanded liability strategies to be successful, agency personnel 
would need the motivation, resources, or expertise to independently 
                                                     
231. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-925, LABOR’S EFFORTS TO ENFORCE 
PROTECTIONS FOR DAY LABORERS COULD BENEFIT FROM BETTER DATA AND GUIDANCE 14–15 
(2002), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02925.pdf [https://perma.cc/G95U-6M9B] (explaining that 
the day laborer workforce is prone to workplace abuses such as wage theft); VALENZUELA JR. ET 
AL., supra note 47, at 22 (explaining that the day labor market is rife with workplace violations, 
including a high incidence of wage theft); Ruan, supra note 159, at 1110 (explaining that wage theft 
is rampant in low-wage, frontline industries). 
232. Bernhardt et al., An Introduction to the “Gloves-off Economy”, in THE GLOVES-OFF 
ECONOMY, supra note 53, at 2. 
233. See supra Section II.B.3. 
234. See supra Section II.B.4. 
235. See supra text accompanying note 120. 
236. See supra text accompanying notes 121–122. 
237. See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text. 
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investigate what other individuals or entities could be held liable.238 
While it is often easiest to find liability against the low-level contractor 
who most obviously employs the worker, holding the larger employer 
accountable can have a greater impact because those entities, “located at 
higher levels of industry structures,” often drive noncompliance and 
have the ability to curb it.239 Without such specific support of an 
advocate or agency personnel, however, an expanded liability strategy 
that relies solely on workers to “blame” their multiple employers will 
ultimately fail in holding multiple or larger employers higher up the 
supply chain accountable for wage theft.240 
Further, agencies or courts can have difficulty applying the complex 
legal tests to hold employers higher up the chain liable. Less than one 
third of the expanded liability strategies envision that agencies and 
courts can hold multiple employers liable for wage theft by simply 
authorizing joint and several liability. As a practical matter, the agency 
or court will have to correctly apply a highly politicized and confusing 
legal doctrine of “joint employment” to hold multiple employers liable 
for wage theft. The doctrine focuses on an “economic reality” test, 
which examines the relationship between the worker and putative 
employer but has “detoured into a quagmire of factors.”241 Courts 
considering the issue have sometimes disagreed about the essential 
approach.242 In 2017, DOL changed its previous interpretation with the 
change in administration by withdrawing its earlier 2016 guidance.243 
Franchisors, seeking to avoid the legal obligations of being an employer, 
are lobbying state legislatures to enact laws to shield themselves from 
joint employment liability with their franchisees.244 The current 
landscape, therefore, makes it a struggle to navigate the changing 
                                                     
238. An advocate or attorney could be helpful in this regard, but many workers fail to find such 
help. See supra text accompanying note 65. 
239. Weil, Enforcing Labour Standards in Fissured Workplaces, supra note 77, at 44; see also 
Perez, supra note 149, at 303. 
240. See supra notes 148–154 and accompanying text. 
241. Bruce Goldstein et al., Enforcing Labor Standards in the Modern American Sweatshop: 
Rediscovering the Statutory Standard of Employment, 46 UCLA L. REV. 983, 1055 (1999). 
242. Hall v. DIRECTV, LLC, 846 F.3d 757, 770 n.9 (4th Cir. 2017) (discussing the confused 
state of FLSA joint employment case law). 
243. News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, U.S. Secretary of Labor Withdraws Joint Employment, 
Independent Contractor Informal Guidance (June 7, 2017), https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/ 
opa/opa20170607 [https://perma.cc/Z7EW-27MR]. 
244. Marni von Wilpert, States with Joint-Employer Shield Laws Are Protecting Wealthy Corporate 
Franchisers at the Expense of Franchisees and Workers, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Feb. 13, 2018), 
https://www.epi.org/publication/states-with-joint-employer-shield-laws-are-protecting-wealthy-
corporate-franchisers-at-the-expense-of-franchisees-and-workers/ [https://perma.cc/6GWJ-M58D]. 
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regulatory, judicial, and legislative definitions of joint employment 
liability.245 As any strategy for expanding liability must be implemented 
and enforced by the agencies and courts, the question becomes whether 
they can effectively do so in order to hold multiple employers 
responsible. Although courts are normally in the business of interpreting 
law, it is less clear whether agency officials, who are more often tasked 
with determining the question of joint employment, will have the legal 
competency—or the will—to apply the law correctly.246 
At the same time, confusion about the joint employment doctrine 
makes it difficult for employers to understand whether their behavior is 
illegal. As discussed in the enhanced penalties section, deterrence 
requires that employers understand how to comply with the law.247 Yet, 
strategies that generally expand liability by recognizing joint and several 
liability do not provide clear guidance on who exactly is liable.248 Under 
the confusion of the joint employment doctrine, it is easy for employers 
to incorrectly believe that the law does not apply to them. 
In contrast, expanded liability strategies that create direct or successor 
liability circumvent some of these problems by explicitly defining who 
is an employer. In Oregon, for example, the direct liability strategy is 
more clear about which individuals or entities will be held liable for 
wages: “[a]ny person who knowingly uses the services of an unlicensed 
labor contractor.”249 Previous studies have shown that when employers 
higher up the supply chain are clearly held accountable, they can help 
monitor wage theft that is occurring further down the subcontracting 
chain.250 Successor liability strategies also explicitly define employers to 
                                                     
245. Nina K. Markey, Continuing Uncertainty for Employers Seeking to Navigate Joint 




246. Sidney A. Shapiro, The Failure to Understand Expertise in Administrative Law: The 
Problem and the Consequences, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1097, 1110 (2015); see also Scott Burris 
et al., Law in Public Health Systems and Services Research, in PUBLIC HEALTH LAW RESEARCH: 
THEORY AND METHODS 80 (Alexander C. Wagenaar & Scott Burris eds., 2013) (citing literature 
noting the importance of public health regulators to exhibit competency in the use of legal authority 
and appreciation of its boundaries). 
247. See supra text accompanying notes 225–226. 
248. Most laws do not state anything beyond providing authority for joint and several liability. 
See, e.g., MIAMI-DADE, FLA., CODE § 22-5(3) (2019) (stating that an order may specify two or more 
employers as jointly and severally liable); PHILA., PA., CODE § 9-4306 (2019) (authorizing that 
respondents may be held as jointly and severally liable for any amount payable to the complainant). 
249. OR. REV. STAT. § 658.465(1) (2019). 
250. Weil, Crafting a Progressive Workplace Regulatory Policy, supra note 9, at 141–43 
(recounting the success of the DOL program to get garment producers to monitor down the 
subcontracting chain within the industry). 
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include successor entities or corporate officials to address the case of the 
undercapitalized or disappearing employers.251 Jurisdictions, therefore, 
that explicitly define liability have a higher likelihood of success 
because they more clearly signal to employers when they will be held 
liable as joint employers. 
E. Informing Workers and Employers 
Half of the anti-wage theft laws reviewed include information 
requirements—a broad set of mandates that require employers, 
government actors, and sometimes both, to provide, collect, or share 
information with either their workers or the public. 
Of the information requirements, nearly half involve the strategy of 
information disclosures.252 Nineteen percent require postings by the 
employer regarding wage-related rights while roughly a quarter require 
employers to mandatorily disclose wage-related rights or other relevant 
information, such as the employer’s name, address, and phone number 
or the workers’ pay rate, usually at the time of hiring.253 The idea behind 
this strategy is that it can protect the recipients of the information to 
make better and more informed choices, while making those who 
disclose behave more honestly and diligently.254 As this regulation has 
become increasingly common, scholars have critiqued the ability of 
disclosure schemes to accomplish these regulatory goals.255 These 
scholars question whether such disclosures are effective because 
disclosures rely on a belief that individuals are rational, self-governing 
actors who are able to process and use the information wisely.256 
In particular, information disclosures cannot be effective if workers 
do not understand the information provided. The way in which 
information is provided may be equally or more important than 
                                                     
251. See supra text accompanying note 121. 
252. See supra Section II.B.5. 
253. See supra paragraph accompanying note 123. 
254. Ripken, supra note 13, at 145–46 (“The disclosure of material information is said to do 
everything from producing more transparent and efficient markets, to making corporate executives 
behave more honestly and diligently, to decreasing investor risks and protecting the public interest.”). 
255. Dalley, supra note 13, at 1090–91; Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 181, at 454–55; Troy 
A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences for Securities 
Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 435–36 (2003); Ripken, supra note 13, at 146. But see Cynthia 
Estlund, Just the Facts: The Case for Workplace Transparency 63 STAN. L. REV. 351, 355 (2011) 
(“Mandatory disclosure can play a useful role both within the wide domain of private ordering and 
among the many aspects of employment that are subject to mandatory rights or minimum terms.”) 
[hereinafter Estlund, Just the Facts]. 
256. Ripken, supra note 13, at 146. 
09 - Lee & Smith.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/30/2019  10:38 AM 
802 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:759 
 
providing the information itself.257 Given that some workers may have 
issues with literacy, information provided to workers should properly 
reflect their literacy and education levels to maximize its 
effectiveness.258 Further, studies show that individuals tend to be more 
readily persuaded by oral rather than written communications.259 All 
anti-wage theft information disclosure strategies, however, involve 
providing written information to workers. Workers may not understand 
passively-provided written information, particularly as it applies to an 
individual worker’s situation. A poster stating what minimum and 
overtime wages are, for example, may not help a worker understand 
whether her being classified as an employee exempt from overtime is 
proper. Understanding whether wage theft is happening requires a more 
interactive and personalized analysis.260 Finally, too much information 
can be a problem.261 At the time of hiring, workers are often required to 
fill out and read numerous documents, so mandatory disclosures can 
become easily lost within a pile of paperwork.262 Studies, too, have 
shown that a worker’s understanding may be more shaped by norms, 
even in the face of more accurate information.263 Information disclosures 
strategies, therefore, run the risk that workers will simply fail to 
understand the information provided. 
Even when equipped with accurate information, workers may not act 
to address wage theft. Once workers have processed the new 
information, “they must decide whether and how to change their 
behavior based on that information.”264 Workers may not make the 
expected “rational” choices based on accurate information, such as 
negotiating or challenging employers who have violated the law or filing 
a complaint with a governmental agency.265 As discussed elsewhere, 
                                                     
257. Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 228, at 1534; Weil et al., supra note 13, at 161. 
258. Alexander, Workplace Information-Forcing, supra note 10, at 531. Some jurisdictions seek 
to address the concern of limited English proficient (LEP) workers and require employers to post or 
provide information in a variety of languages. See supra text accompanying note 125. 
259. Dalley, supra note 13, at 1114. 
260. See supra note 145 (providing an example of how a personalized analysis is required to 
determine whether overtime wages are owed). 
261. Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 13, at 214; Paredes, supra note 255, at 435; Ripken, supra note 
13, at 147. 
262. See, e.g., Maye v. Smith Barney, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 100, 106–07 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (noting that 
employees were required by their new employer to sign documents seventy-five times during a two-
hour period without explanation of the documents’ contents or sufficient opportunity to read them). 
263. Pauline T. Kim, Norms, Learning, and Law: Exploring the Influences on Workers’ Legal 
Knowledge, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 447, 495–96 (1999). 
264. Dalley, supra note 13, at 1116.  
265. Paredes, supra note 255, at 436; Ripken, supra note 13, at 146; see also Weil et al., supra 
note 13, at 156 (describing key factors as to whether the information will be embedded in the users’ 
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workers are reluctant to claim wage theft for a variety of reasons, such as 
the belief that such complaints will either be ineffective or result in 
retaliation.266 
Information disclosures may also fail to produce employer 
compliance. Employers may either fail to understand how such 
information applies to their specific business or how to specifically make 
their pay practices come into legal compliance. They may also have 
confirmation or self-serving bias, which prevents individuals from 
accepting information that contradicts their preexisting beliefs or 
adversely affects their personal interests.267 Such bias provides a strong 
motivation for employers to resist accepting that their particular way of 
doing business is wrong. 
Further, an erroneous assumption is that employers will behave more 
diligently and honestly because they know their pay practices will be 
“regularly exposed to the light of day.” 268 There are several reasons why 
this exposure is likely insufficient to motivate employers to comply. The 
exposure of employer pay practices is limited to workers and not to 
governmental agencies or the broader public. Many employers correctly 
believe that workers are unlikely to act on such information.269 Even 
confronted with information that confirms unlawful behavior, employers 
may still risk noncompliance either because there is an insufficient threat 
of enforcement or because such pay practices reflect cultural norms 
within the industry. 
Employers, too, may simply not comply with the posting and 
mandatory disclosure requirements. Indeed, a study of 239 employers’ 
compliance with posting requirements found no more than half of the 
employers posted as required.270 Another study of restaurants in the 
Chinatown District of San Francisco found that two thirds had failed to 
comply with the posting requirements (many who posted had also failed 
to post in a language other than English even though postings were 
available in Chinese).271 Employers willing to violate the substantive 
                                                     
decision-making, including the information’s perceived value in achieving the users’ goals and its 
compatibility with decision-making routines). 
266. See supra text accompanying notes 62–64. 
267. Dalley, supra note 13, at 1114; Ripken, supra note 13, at 174. 
268. Ripken, supra note 13, at 152 (stating that one of the goals of disclosure rules is to induce 
corporate managers to behave more diligently and honestly because they know their actions will be 
regularly exposed to the light of day). 
269. See supra text accompanying notes 155–157. 
270. Lee Tyner et al., Labor Law Posting Compliance: The Impact of Organizational 
Characteristics, 18 . L.J. 251, 257 (2008).  
271. Meredith Minkler et al., Wage Theft as a Neglected Public Health Problem, An Overview and 
Case Study from San Francisco’s Chinatown District, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1010, 1013 (2014). 
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provisions of the law are unlikely to comply with the information 
disclosure requirements.272 Further, some laws do not provide for any 
consequences for employers who fail to comply with information 
disclosure requirements.273 Even when laws penalize the failure to abide 
by the information disclosure requirements, employers may not be 
motivated to comply if the threat of penalties is not sufficiently real. 
In contrast to the employer-based information disclosure strategies, a 
small minority of information requirements authorize agencies 
themselves to perform outreach and education to workers (10%) and 
employers (4%). Some laws additionally specify that the outreach should 
be conducted in cooperation with community organizations.274 As 
discussed more fully in the next Part, such strategies appear to have 
more potential than information disclosure strategies because agencies 
can actively tailor the presentation and format of such information so 
that it is more readily understood.275 
Roughly a fifth (21%) of the information requirements involve the 
strategy of employer recordkeeping of wage-related information.276 As 
with information disclosures, the act of requiring employers to keep 
payroll records does not automatically translate into an employer’s 
voluntary compliance with anti-wage theft laws.277 Employers may also 
fail to keep records. In the context of occupational safety and health, for 
example, one study found that 90% of employers failed to comply with 
the recordkeeping requirements related to workplace injuries mandated 
by OSHA.278 When employers do keep records, however, it can be 
useful for providing agencies or workers with the information needed to 
establish a case of wage theft.279 As an employer’s failure to keep 
required records can be an additional barrier to workers seeking to 
                                                     
272. In some instances, the failure to comply may be based on an employer not understanding the 
law well enough to disclose the required information accurately. While many jurisdictions create 
form posters or disclosures, employers are still required to fill out parts of some of these documents 
and may not do so accurately. 
273. See, e.g., BROWARD COUNTY, FLA., ORDINANCE 2018-36, ch. 20½, § 20½-8 (2019). 
274. See, e.g., S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 12R.25 (2019) (“The Office of Labor Standards 
Enforcement shall establish a community-based outreach program to conduct education and 
outreach to employees.”). 
275. See infra text accompanying notes 303–307. 
276. Federal law has long required collection of this information by covered employers. 
29 U.S.C. § 211(c) (2018). 
277. See supra paragraph accompanying note 267. 
278. Sara E. Wuellner & David K. Bonauto, Exploring the Relationship Between Employer 
Recordkeeping and Underreporting in the BLS Survey of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses, 57 
AM. J. INDUS. MED. 1133, 1139 (2014). 
279. Talbot, supra note 154. 
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enforce their rights, a small minority (12%) of the information 
requirements address this problem by using the strategy of burden 
shifting. Under such a burden-shifting regime, if an employer has failed 
to keep records, the burden shifts from the worker to the employer to 
establish that they did not commit wage theft.280 The usefulness of the 
strategy of employer recordkeeping, like so many other anti-wage theft 
strategies, rests on the uncertain prerequisites of action by workers or 
agencies seeking to establish wage theft violations. 
Finally, a small minority (10%) of the information requirements 
mandate varied forms of agency data collection and disclosure. Unlike 
information strategies that seek to address information asymmetries 
between workers and employers, these strategies look towards data 
collection, evaluation, and information transparency to foster agencies 
that can be more flexibly responsive to input and collaboration.281 Some 
laws require the collection of data related to recorded instances of wage 
theft or agency enforcement activities, which is then reported to law-
making bodies or the public.282 A few laws require specialized subsets of 
employers to provide wage reports directly to the agency.283 As 
discussed in the next Part, such data collection has the potential to 
improve the way in which the agency carries out its anti-wage theft 
strategies. 
IV. RETHINKING, RECONCEIVING, AND LOOKING BEYOND 
REGULATION 
Despite finding that many of the most common anti-wage theft 
strategies are limited, this Article does not conclude that state and local 
regulation is futile. Governments can do things that individual workers 
cannot, such as declare the rule of law, provide oversight, and create 
new rights and mechanisms to enforce the law. Low-wage workers have 
directly led many law reform efforts through advocacy organizations, 
which is significant not only to their own empowerment but also as a 
                                                     
280. Federal law already provides for a similar burden-shifting regime where employers fail to 
comply with the recordkeeping requirements of the FLSA. See Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery, 
328 U.S. 680, 687–88 (1946).  
281. See Solomon, supra note 12, at 834 (describing new governance approaches as including 
public participation, data provision, transparency, benchmarking, and a sharing of best practices). 
282. See, e.g., S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE §§ 12R.5, 12R.7, 12R.16–18 (2019) (providing that 
agency representatives may access employers’ records and may publicly post notice of an 
employer’s failure to comply). 
283. See, e.g., BERKELEY, CAL., CODE § 13.104 (2019) (requiring business owners in the 
construction industry to provide construction pay transparency reports with information about the 
contractors and subcontractors).  
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means to increase their political power.284 Further, individual workers 
have benefitted from the anti-wage theft strategies currently in place, 
including the ability to recover lost wages. State and local regulation, 
therefore, still holds promise for addressing the rollback of federal 
workplace protections. 
Our analysis of the recent wave of anti-wage theft strategies implies 
that better choices can be made about what strategies to advocate for 
while agencies can consider more strategic implementation by 
reconceiving of the role of government. At the same time, strategies that 
look beyond governmental regulation are also valuable. For those 
jurisdictions where state and local regulation becomes impossible 
because of politics, nongovernmental strategies are potentially promising 
because such strategies look to workers, unions, worker centers, and 
community organizations rather than government to address wage theft. 
A. Promising Anti-Wage Theft Strategies 
In examining the twenty-two types of anti-wage theft strategies, we 
found several innovative approaches that are promising because they 
avoid many of the assumptions embedded in the most common 
regulatory strategies. These strategies have the potential to address some 
of the problems with such failed regulatory strategies by facilitating 
rights claiming, increasing the effectiveness of command and control 
regulation, and tailoring information requirements to help individuals 
understand and act on the information provided. While we recognize that 
political realties may ultimately impact the contents of anti-wage theft 
laws, we highlight these strategies as a means to focus additional 
advocacy and research efforts on them. 
Several anti-wage theft strategies seek to overcome the traditional 
regulatory failure of rights-claiming strategies by reducing likely barriers 
to “naming, blaming, and claiming.”285 These strategies expand the 
definition of who can be a complainant, facilitate processes for workers 
who may fear retaliation, and shift the heavy burden of proof which 
                                                     
284. A number of resources cover these local campaigns. See, e.g., BOBO, supra note 21, at 197 
(discussing the law reform efforts led by Somos Un Pueblo Unido, a statewide membership-based 
immigrant rights organization); Deborah Axt, Amy Carroll & Andrew Friedman, The Campaign to 
Pass New York’s Wage Theft Prevention Act, 45 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 154, 154 (2001)  
(describing how Make the Road New York, an organization that fights for economic opportunity for 
and civic participation of immigrants, led the coalition that would take the local wage theft 
campaigns to the state level); THEODORE, supra note 78, at 17 (recounting how Casa Latina, a 
community-based immigrant rights organization, led the charge to get the wage theft ordinance 
enacted in Seattle). 
285. See supra Section III.A. 
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traditionally faces employees. For example, authorizing interested 
community members and organizations to initiate complaints opens up 
the complaint process to those who are insulated from employer 
retaliation. As discussed in the next Section, agency collaboration with 
community organizations can help encourage complaints that otherwise 
would not be brought. Permitting anonymous complaints could make it 
less risky, and thus less threatening, for workers and others to file 
complaints.286 
Once complaints are filed, the burden shifting required when 
employers fail to maintain or provide pay-related records makes it easier 
for workers to prove their unpaid wage claims.287 Knowing they need 
not have records to prevail may also encourage more workers to come 
forward. Employers too may find it harder to fire workers in retaliation 
where the law prohibits termination without good cause within a certain 
period of the worker’s protected conduct.288 The presumption of 
retaliation when termination occurs close in time to protected activities 
should also make it easier for workers to prove retaliation.289 All of these 
strategies are potentially promising but require further study to truly 
know whether they are effective in facilitating worker complaints.290 
Even if they do facilitate worker complaints, there is still the ultimate 
question of whether such complaints will significantly reduce wage 
theft—particularly if they continue to fail to overlap with the worst and 
most systemic violators.291 
Further, several anti-wage theft strategies attempt to improve on the 
failure of traditional command and control tactics for enforcement 
because agencies lack the will, resources, or expertise to robustly 
investigate and penalize employers who have acted illegally. Rather than 
seek to hold employers accountable after-the-fact, a little-used strategy is 
to require certain high-risk employers, such as car washes, nail salons, or 
construction contractors, to provide wage bonds in conjunction with a 
specialized license to operate their business.292 Such bonds require 
                                                     
286. While not specifically an anti-wage theft strategy, some jurisdictions have passed legislation 
that prohibits blacklisting, which might prove useful in limiting wage-related retaliation. See, e.g., 
WASH. REV. CODE § 49.44.010 (2019). 
287. Talbot, supra note 154. 
288. CHALLENGING THE BUSINESS OF FEAR, supra note 172, at 36. 
289. See id. 
290. Further studies could focus on jurisdictions with such presumptions to research the extent to 
which burden shifting is actually being used and, if so, whether it has a meaningful impact. 
291. See supra notes 168–169 and accompanying text. 
292. BERKELEY, CAL., CODE § 13.104.060 (2019) (construction); N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE 
§ 20-542 (2019) (car washes); OR. REV. STAT. § 658.419 (2019) (farm labor contractors). 
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employers, who are either repeat violators or in industries with rampant 
wage theft, to secure a bond as a form of insurance in case of wage 
theft.293 Another strategy that seeks to prevent wage theft is requiring 
employers to submit wage reports to the agency.294 Requirements to self-
report directly to the agency might encourage voluntary compliance by 
some employers.295 Such data could help agencies to shortcut the 
investigatory process, locate non-compliant employers, and more 
flexibly respond to different kinds of employers. 
Other strategies seek to reduce the amount of discretion available to 
agencies that may lack the will or expertise to engage in robust 
enforcement. Expanded liability strategies, for example, which more 
clearly delineate the scope of liability for joint employers, arguably 
make the imposition of such liability against multiple employers more 
likely.296 Some enhanced penalty strategies prohibit agencies from 
waiving penalties where wage theft has occurred.297 Finally, some 
penalty strategies attempt to create a self-funding mechanism, where the 
costs of enforcement are paid by the employer back to the agency, to 
provide agencies with additional resources.298 However, “[s]everal 
administrators argued against this method of financing, saying that their 
goal was to obtain restitution from employers, not money for the 
agency.”299 
The strategy of data collection and reporting of information by 
agencies has the promise of helping them overcome ossified command 
and control regulatory tactics to become more flexible, responsive, and 
                                                     
293. Wage bonds may be prohibitively expensive for small businesses. It may be necessary to 
exempt such small businesses or find other ways, such as a local or state tax credit, to assist 
businesses in purchasing such wage bonds.  
294. See, e.g., BERKELEY, CAL., CODE § 13.104.040 (2019) (requiring owner to submit a 
Construction Pay Transparency Report). 
295. This strategy assumes that the information provided to the agency is accurate. 
296. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 218.7 (West 2019) (specifying that a construction contractor 
shall be liable for any wage debt incurred by a subcontractor at any tier acting for the direct 
contractor); OR. REV. STAT. § 658.415 (2019) (holding “[a]ny person who uses the services of a 
labor contractor” liable for the wages of the contractor’s workers).  
297. See, e.g., FLAGSTAFF, ARIZ., CODE § 15-01-001-0007(A) (2019) (requiring the payment of 
liquidated damages); LOUISVILLE, KY., CODE § 112.99 (2019) (requiring payment of full amount of 
wages due and civil penalty); OSCEOLA COUNTY, FLA., CODE § 25-6(a)(2) (2019) (requiring 
restitution and treble damages). On the flip side, mandatory penalties can result in less flexibility for 
agencies that want to use the discretion to waive penalties as an inducement to get employers to 
settle worker complaints more quickly. 
298. See, e.g., ST. PETERSBURG, FLA., CODE § 15-45(b)(2) (2019) (finding an employer in 
violation required to pay “administrative costs of processing the claim and all the costs of the 
hearing”). Some state agencies have had success with such funding mechanisms. See Lurie, supra 
note 107, at 432.  
299. See Lurie, supra note 107, at 432. 
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problem-solving oriented. The reporting of data to governing bodies or 
the public can increase agency accountability, if the reported data helps 
to assess agency actions.300 In theory, the data can also be used to better 
allocate enforcement resources and to adjust the law based on patterns or 
concerns that emerge.301 Agencies themselves can use the data to engage 
in self-evaluation and strategizing that will help them more effectively 
tackle the issue of wage theft. Yet while such data collection and 
reporting strategies are promising, the successful use of data will largely 
be dependent on whether the data itself reflects useful and accurate 
information, and the ability of the public, lawmakers, or agency 
personnel to make good use of it.302 
Finally, there may be other strategies that involve providing 
information useful to the fight against wage theft instead of relying on 
the failed strategy of information disclosures. For example, active forms 
of communicating information, such as in-person trainings, may be more 
effective than posters and written disclosures for both employers and 
workers.303 Very few information strategies involve outreach and 
education to either workers or employers.304 Yet such strategies offer the 
potential for agencies to create programs that use an active means of 
providing information, which can be more effective in helping workers 
understand their rights and helping employers come into compliance.305 
Further, trainings may provide concrete tools for workers and 
employers, such as pre-printed cards or booklets where workers can take 
relevant notes about the terms and conditions of their jobs or the hours 
that they have worked or sample industry-specific policies about pay 
                                                     
300. See Dalley, supra note 13, at 1122–23; Solomon, supra note 12, at 823. 
301. Making better use of data already collected by state agencies, such as data regarding 
unemployment or workers’ compensation, might prove useful. Information sharing between agencies 
could help agencies better identify targets for investigation and enforcement of wage laws. See ANDREW 
ELMORE & MUZAFFAR CHISTI, MIGRATION POLICY INST., STRATEGIC LEVERAGE: USE OF STATE AND 
LOCAL LAWS TO ENFORCE STANDARDS IN IMMIGRANT-DENSE OCCUPATIONS 30–33 (2018). 
302. An open question is whether the actual data that is being collected, such as the number of 
complaints filed, the amount of wages recovered, and the budgetary costs expended on the program 
is ultimately the kind of data that helps to create agency accountability. See Jennifer Shkabatur, 
Transparency With(out) Accountability: Open Government in the United States, 31 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 80, 118 (2012) (discussing how online transparency rules for agencies fail to result in 
the disclosure of useful information for the public). Political conditions can also prevent 
accountability even if there is good data disclosure. Tiago Pexioto, The Uncertain Relationship 
Between Open Data and Accountability: A Response to Yu and Robinson’s the New Ambiguity of 
Open Government, 60 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 200, 213 (2013). 
303. See supra note 259 and accompanying text. 
304. Only thirteen states and localities have employed information strategies involving outreach 
and education. 
305. BOBO, supra note 21, at 108–09. 
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practices.306 As explained more fully below, information strategies are 
likely to be more successful if they involve cooperation with employer 
networks or community organizations that can help tailor such 
educational strategies to be more accessible, useful, and culturally 
appropriate to their audiences.307 
B. Rethinking Agency Approaches 
Rethinking the ways in which agencies traditionally approach anti-
wage theft strategies has the potential to make them more effective by 
reconceiving the role of government and how it might cooperate with 
workers, communities, and regulated entities. Scholars who have 
explored “new governance” theory argue that government should enter 
into non-traditional and potentially collaborative arrangements with 
workers, worker advocates, or employers to improve regulatory 
outcomes.308 These more flexible approaches are intended to help 
confront the failures of the traditional command and control regime, 
including the lack of agency staff and resources309 and any limitations 
regarding the motivation, competency, and bias of agency staff and 
leadership.310 They also seek to address the failures of traditional rights 
claiming and information strategies. This Section briefly reviews why 
such approaches are more likely to be productive while recognizing 
some reservations about successfully executing them. 
1. Differentiating Employers 
There are vast differences between large companies with human 
resources departments, mom and pop businesses inadvertently violating 
the law, and some of the worst fly-by-night operations and repeat 
offenders who deliberately build their business model around wage theft. 
                                                     
306. See, e.g., Liz Robbins, New Weapon in Day Laborers’ Fight Against Wage Theft: A 
Smartphone App, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/02/nyregion/new-
weapon-in-day-laborers-fight-against-wage-theft-a-smartphone-app.html [https://perma.cc/Q4GY-
M754] (discussing the creation of a new app that allows day laborers to record such information). 
307. See supra Sections IV.B.1, IV.B.2. 
308. These collaborative arrangements are alternatively called co-governance, tripartism, or 
collaborative governance. IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: 
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 5 (1992); Chris Ansell & Alison Gash, Collaborative 
Governance in Theory and Practice, 18 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 543, 544–45 (2007); 
Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace, supra note 213, at 362–65; Fine & Gordon, supra 
note 8, at 559–60; Lobel, Interlocking Regulatory, supra note 12, at 1141. 
309. See supra notes 56–57. 
310. Weil, Crafting a Progressive Workplace Regulatory Policy, supra note 9, at 133 
(recognizing that agencies get into “ruts” in carrying out enforcement). 
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Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite recognized the need for enforcement 
systems to be responsive to the diversity of the entities they are trying to 
regulate.311 They suggested an enforcement system that resembles a 
pyramid, where the bottom would include more cooperative regulatory 
measures and the top would involve very real and harsh penalties.312 The 
rationale for the pyramid enforcement system is that persuasion is cheap 
and punishment is expensive.313 Given the diversity of employers, less 
resource-intensive cooperative mechanisms might be more appropriate 
for certain kinds of employers while meaningful penalties might be 
necessary for others.314 The anti-wage theft laws we examined, with the 
exception of a handful of laws focused on the day labor, construction, 
and temporary staffing industries, tend to treat all employers 
uniformly.315 While the absence of differential treatment does not 
necessarily mean that agencies cannot do so upon implementation, it 
suggests that the default will be a one-size-fits-all use of anti-wage theft 
strategies. 
Large companies, for example, often care about their reputation, so 
the threat of negative publicity may effectively deter wage theft.316 
Agencies might cooperatively engage with larger companies to find 
ways to have them self-enforce the downstream subcontractors of 
franchisees that comprise their business. David Weil has extensively 
studied the concept of how to hold “‘lead firms’ (i.e., firms at the top of 
the industry structure)” accountable in order to address some of the 
problems associated with the fissured workplace.317 He proposes a 
cooperative agreement between governmental agencies and top brands, 
focused on specific industries that “could include a commitment by the 
brand to cascade information through its company-owned properties and 
outlets, and to its franchisees, as well as a commitment to review 
employment practices with franchisees when other franchise standards 
are being reviewed.”318 
                                                     
311. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 308, at 38–39. 
312. Id. 
313. Id. 
314. Id. at 26–27.  
315. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-15-1 (West 2019) (focusing on day laborers); OR. REV. 
STAT. § 658.405 (2019) (focusing on construction contractors). 
316. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 308, at 22; Weil, Enforcing Workplace Standards in 
Fissured Workplaces, supra note 77, at 46–47. 
317. See Weil, Enforcing Labour Standards in Fissured Workplaces, supra note 77, at 33; WEIL, 
IMPROVING WORKPLACE CONDITIONS, supra note 73, at 79. 
318. WEIL, IMPROVING WORKPLACE CONDITIONS, supra note 73, at 78. 
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In fact, David Weil cites as a successful example DOL’s cooperative 
agreements in the 1990s with manufacturers in the garment industry that 
entered into monitoring arrangements with its subcontractors.319 With 
those cooperative agreements, DOL used the harsh threat of the “hot 
goods” provision, which involves preventing the shipment of goods 
produced in violation of the wage and hour laws, to induce such 
cooperation.320 Other threats might include holding employers at the top 
responsible for enhanced penalties through various joint employment 
theories. In particular, those anti-wage theft strategies that expand 
employer liability more directly—which we found in only a minority of 
anti-wage theft laws—become a much more significant tool for inducing 
compliance.321 
Some employers may simply need more assistance to get into 
compliance.322 For example, unsophisticated employers who lack legal 
counsel could benefit from training on how to properly calculate wages 
or access to templates for required recordkeeping. We were generally 
unable, however, to find many reported examples of robust cooperation 
between employer groups and state and local agencies with the aim of 
improving compliance, although there were a few jurisdictions that 
mandated outreach or education to employers.323 Yet employer 
networks—often specific to certain industries—can have a great impact 
on employer behavior to the extent that employers participate in such 
networks.324 Agencies can cooperate with such employer networks to 
engage in active forms of education and develop industry-specific model 
policies. 
Those employers whose business model is built on wage theft may 
not care about negative publicity or complying with the law, as long as 
                                                     
319. David Weil, Public Enforcement/Private Monitoring: Evaluating a New Approach to 
Regulating the Minimum Wage, 58 INDUS. & L. REL. REV. 238, 255 (2005). 
320. Id. at 244. 
321. See supra notes 249–250 and accompanying text. 
322. See, e.g., Fine & Gordon, supra note 8, at 555 (noting that small businesses are less likely to 
have sophisticated human resources departments that facilitate proactive learning about the law); 
Weil, Crafting a Progressive Workplace Regulatory Policy, supra note 9, at 138 (discussing how 
sometimes employers simply need information to move towards compliance). 
323. See, e.g., FLAGSTAFF, ARIZ., CODE § 15-01-001-0007(F) (2019) (establishing an education 
and outreach program to both employees and employers); SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE 
§ 3.15.000(A) (2019) (“[p]romoting labor standards through outreach, education, technical 
assistance, and training for employees and employers”). 
324. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 308, at 39; WEIL, IMPROVING WORKPLACE CONDITIONS, 
supra note 73, at 57; see also Chris Fuchs, Lawsuit Filed by Nail Salon Trade Groups Against New 
York State Dismissed, NBC NEWS (Dec. 9, 2015, 2:48 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-
america/lawsuit-filed-nail-salon-trade-groups-against-new-york-state-n477156 
[https://perma.cc/D7CQ-E7S7] (noting employer networks for the nail salon industry). 
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they are able to continue violating the law with impunity. These 
employers may be more likely deterred if there is a credible threat of 
severe penalties, such as having their businesses shut down or facing 
criminal charges. This implies that a variety of strategies beyond civil 
penalties are needed. In New York, for example, after a news article 
exposed rampant wage theft within the nail salon industry, Governor 
Cuomo organized a task force and focused its investigation on the 
industry.325 As part of its enforcement, New York focused on shutting 
down operations of unlicensed businesses and revoking the licenses of 
businesses that were substantially out of compliance.326 In California, the 
Labor Commissioner charged an owner of a San Diego restaurant with 
felony grand wage theft by false pretenses.327 It may be that these 
strategies require dissemination through employer networks of 
information about enforcement activity to make deterrence truly 
effective.328 For employers that operate in multiple jurisdictions, it might 
help to coordinate and cooperate across local agencies to pool 
resources.329 Since the imposition of penalties is resource-intensive, 
agencies should strategically consider targeting those industries that 
have the highest number of violations and would be likely most 
responsive to these kinds of strategies. As discussed in the next Section, 
this approach necessarily involves proactively initiating investigations, 
perhaps in consultation with worker advocacy organizations, rather than 
relying solely on an enforcement model based on incoming 
complaints.330 
                                                     
325. Frida Garza, Recovered Wages: New York’s Nail Salons Must Finally Compensate Their 
Workers for Wage Theft, QUARTZ (May 9, 2016), https://qz.com/679127/new-yorks-nail-salons-
must-finally-compensate-their-workers-for-wage-theft/ [https://perma.cc/D65A-ZNJF]. 
326. Press Release, New York State Governor’s Office, Governor Cuomo Introduces Legislation 
and Comprehensive Plan to Protect Nail Salon Workers and Educate Employers (May 18, 2015), 
https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-introduces-legislation-and-comprehensive-
plan-protect-nail-salon-workers-and [https://perma.cc/27LC-BX6S]. 
327. Gail Cecchettini Whaley, California Wage Theft Case Leads to Landmark Criminal 
Conviction, HRWATCHDOG (Dec. 21, 2016), http://hrwatchdog.calchamber.com/2016/12/california-
wage-theft-case-landmark-criminal-conviction/ [https://perma.cc/649L-YU38]. 
328. WEIL, IMPROVING WORKPLACE CONDITIONS, supra note 73, at 56–57, 74 (noting that 
holding independent motels accountable for wage theft will not necessarily deter other operators 
within the same industry because of a lack of “glue”). 
329. KOONZE ET AL., supra note 79, at 13. 
330. Weil, A Strategic Approach, supra note 139, at 364. 
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2. Community Partnerships 
Many have advocated for cooperative models of agency enforcement 
with worker organizations to encourage more strategic enforcement.331 
Agencies that devote their enforcement resources exclusively to 
responding to worker complaints may be less effective at combating 
wage theft.332 In contrast, agencies can focus on strategic enforcement 
efforts through community partnerships, which can provide agencies 
with increased on-the-ground information about wage theft.333 Further, 
such community partnerships can play a role in more effectively 
disseminating legal rights information to worker populations.334 
Janice Fine and Jennifer Gordon have argued that worker 
organizations can play a “co-enforcement” role in enforcing workplace 
standards, which would be more effective than an agency driven solely 
by worker complaints.335 Several case studies reveal how the integration 
of worker organizations into agencies can help focus resources on the 
most common and problematic employers where workers would be most 
unlikely to come forward with worker complaints.336 Since 2009, San 
Francisco’s Office of Labor Standards Enforcement (OLSE) has entered 
into contracts with various community groups to increase the efficacy of 
San Francisco’s labor laws.337 Beyond traditional outreach to low-wage 
and immigrant workers, the contracted community groups also help 
make referrals, such that approximately 30% of complaints received by 
OLSE come directly from them.338 In fiscal year 2013 to 2014, the office 
collected more in back wages and interest from the cases filed with the 
help of the groups than from those generated by worker complaints 
alone.339 
                                                     
331. DONALD M. KERWIN & KRISTEN MCCABE, LABOR STANDARDS ENFORCEMENT AND LOW-
WAGE IMMIGRANTS 48 (2011); RONDÓN ICHIKAWA & SMITH, supra note 139, at 12–15; 
THEODORE, supra note 78, at 8–14; Julie A. Su, Enforcing Labor Laws: Wage Theft, the Myth of 
Neutrality, and Agency Transformation, 37 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 143, 153–54 (2016). 
332. See supra text accompanying notes 168–170. 
333. Janice Fine, New Approaches to Enforcing Labor Standards: How Co-Enforcement 
Partnerships between Government and Civil Society Are Showing the Way Forward, 2017 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 143, 145–46 (2017) [hereinafter Fine, New Approaches]. 
334. Id. at 151. 
335. Id. at 146. 
336. Fine & Gordon, supra note 8, at 559–60 (2010); see also KERWIN & MCCABE, supra note 
331, at 12–13; THEODORE, supra note 78, at 8–14; Su, supra note 331, at 153–54. 
337. LOCAL PROGRESS & THE CTR. FOR POPULAR DEMOCRACY, CITY STRATEGIES TO COMBAT 
WAGE THEFT AND EMPOWER WORKERS 4 (2014). 
338. RONDÓN ICHIKAWA & SMITH, supra note 139, at 13. 
339. KOONZE ET AL., supra note 79, at 13. 
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In California, the Labor Commissioner has relied on “community-
based organizations who already have the trust of workers, speak the 
language of workers, [and] understand how violations occur and are 
often masked” to give them leads and help to bridge the trust gap 
between workers and law.340 One such example includes collaborating 
with the Maintenance Cooperation Trust Fund (MCTF), a California 
janitorial nonprofit created through a labor-management partnership that 
seeks to abolish unfair business practices that harm businesses and 
workers in the janitorial industry.341 MCTF has assisted in bringing cases 
that resulted in millions of dollars of unpaid wages for janitors.342 The 
benefits of these collaborations come from the organization’s ability to 
get information directly from workers and information that 
governmental agencies otherwise tend not to have, including more 
intimate knowledge about industry subcontracting.343 Community groups 
can also play a countervailing role when there is political pressure on the 
agency by employers to keep the agency from issuing real and harsh 
penalties.344 
Further, community groups have worked directly with agencies to 
improve the worker complaint processes while better coordinating and 
streamlining investigatory processes.345 The Chicago Area Workers 
Rights Initiative, for example, is a partnership between the Chicago 
Interfaith Workers Rights Center and federal and state agencies to 
improve monitoring and enforcement.346 Among other things, this 
partnership devised a uniform complaint for all agencies as a single page 
form that has all the information that every agency needs, while 
negotiating a system with agencies where the complaints from the 
Center moved to the top of the pile.347 Worker centers can help workers 
file complaints with an agency or in court by providing technical 
expertise for recovering their unpaid wages through the legal system, 
such as helping workers to present accurate information and complete 
                                                     
340. Supra note 331, at 153. 
341. Fine & Gordon, supra note 8, at 565–66. 
342. Id.; see also News Release, Cal. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, California Labor Commissioner 
Cites Two Janitorial Companies More than $1.5 Million for Multiple Wage Theft Violations (May 
8, 2014), https://www.dir.ca.gov/DIRNews/2014/2014-42.pdf [https://perma.cc/52HF-RPT9] 
(noting that MCTF was instrumental in bringing information on a wage theft case that amounted to 
more than $1.5 million in violations). 
343. Fine, New Approaches, supra note 333, at 151–52. 
344. Id. at 152. 
345. Id. at 154. 
346. FINE, WORKER CENTERS, supra note 65, at 82.  
347. Id. 
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documents needed by the agency or court.348 This technical assistance 
helps agencies more efficiently enforce wage laws by encouraging 
workers to come forward and helping them navigate their filed 
complaints. 
With respect to information requirements, an agency can work with 
community-based organizations to more proactively ensure that workers 
understand the information provided.349 In Seattle, for example, the 
Office of Labor Standards selected ten different organizations and 
community partnerships to receive $1 million in funding to provide 
outreach, education, and technical assistance to workers.350 It makes 
sense that worker organizations will not only have better access to 
workers within their communities but also that they can engage in more 
interactive and culturally appropriate forms of education that are more 
likely to assist workers understand their rights.351 
Community partnerships with agencies can help change agency 
culture. These partnerships can play a role in motivating, training, and 
increasing the competency of agency staff.352 Joint efforts by community 
groups and agency staff to educate workers within their communities, 
for example, can not only train agency staff on the particular on-the-
ground issues that workers face but also help motivate them by seeing 
the social cost of wage theft firsthand.353 Well-publicized success by the 
agency, stemming from community partnerships, can motivate agency 
leadership and staff to continue to employ rigorous enforcement 
methods for altering the behavior of employers.354 
3. Barriers to Change 
There are three challenges to altering the ways in which agencies 
traditionally approach anti-wage theft strategies. First, there is the 
question of whether such arrangements should be enumerated within the 
anti-wage theft law itself. There are a few anti-wage theft laws, for 
example, that contain explicit cooperation requirements with respect to 
                                                     
348. Id. 
349. Fine, New Approaches, supra note 333, at 146. 
350. 2017–2019 Community Outreach and Education Fund, OFF. LAB. STANDARDS, 
https://www.seattle.gov/laborstandards/outreach/community-fund/2017-2019-community-outreach-
and-education-fund [https://perma.cc/R4VJ-ACYS]. 
351. Talbot, supra note 154. 
352. Email from Sarah Hymowitz, Staff Att’y, Legal Servs. of N.J. (Dec. 27, 2018, 13:17 CST) 
(on file with authors). 
353. Fine, New Approaches, supra note 333, at 151 (discussing how worker organizations are in 
the unique position to share specialized knowledge with investigators at agencies). 
354. Id. 
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worker education355 or community task forces charged with filing and 
investigating complaints.356 At the same time, we found instances where 
such cooperation occurred informally as a result of direct advocacy by 
nongovernmental organizations with agencies.357 While formalizing such 
agreements can clearly delineate the respective obligations, it can also 
publicize an arrangement that otherwise would politically fly “under the 
radar” unopposed.358 Mandated or pre-set agreements, however, can also 
fail to produce on-the-ground collaboration.359 On the other hand, 
formally requiring collaboration might be less important than creating 
the conditions for successful partnerships. Those who have studied 
public administration describe multiple factors to make collaborative 
governance successful, such as self-reinforcing interactions among 
stakeholders, shared motivation, and the capacity for joint action.360 
Second, the criticism of such cooperative models is that they risk 
agency capture or the appearance of cooptation of the agency by 
employers or workers.361 In the case of employers, the fear is that 
cooperation will simply take the place of robust enforcement. In 
particular, it can stand in tension with the principles of accountability 
because “soft law” or voluntary compliance may simply translate into 
agencies failing to hold employers accountable. The key for successfully 
cooperating with employers, therefore, is not for the agency to opt for 
employer cooperation in place of the traditional enforcement 
approaches, but rather to maintain both approaches simultaneously.362 
                                                     
355. See, e.g., S.F., CAL., CODE § 12R.25 (2019) (establishing its community-based outreach 
program in partnership with organizations); ST. PETERSBURG, FLA., CODE § 15-47(a) (2019) (stating 
that its policy is to engage community-based organizations, including through contract, to assist 
with employer and worker education).  
356. See, e.g., ST. PETERSBURG, FLA., CODE § 15-47(b) (2019) (stating that the appointed official 
by the Mayor “is authorized to direct proactive investigations of designated industries or employers 
in response to alleged [complaints by] employees, residents, organizations, or employers”); N.Y. 
LAB. LAW § 331 (McKinney 2019) (establishing “Fair Wages Task Force” to inspect, ensure 
compliance, and implement provisions of the labor law). Other laws simply broaden who is eligible 
to file a complaint so that it could theoretically include community organizations. See, e.g., LOS 
ALTOS, CAL., CODE § 3.50.080 (2019) (“An employee or any other person may report to the city in 
writing any suspected violation of this chapter.”). 
357. See FINE, WORKER CENTERS, supra note 65, at 84; THEODORE, supra note 78, at 23. 
358. See Fine & Gordon, supra note 8, at 561; Janice Fine, Solving the Problem from Hell: 
Tripartism as a Strategy for Addressing Labour Standards Non-Compliance in the United States, 50 
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 813, 840–42 (2013). 
359. KIRK EMERSON & TINA NABATCHI, COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE REGIMES 174–75 (2015). 
360. Kirk Emerson et al., An Integrative Framework for Collaborative Governance, 22 J. PUB. 
ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 1, 17 (2011). 
361. Solomon, supra note 12, at 827. 
362. Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace, supra note 213, at 387–88; Fine & Gordon, 
supra note 8, at 559, 562.   
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Further, past examples of such enforced self-regulation have been more 
successful when they include worker representatives to assist in 
monitoring and compliance.363 In the case of workers, agencies may be 
attacked for being influenced by worker organizations and generally 
biased against employers.364 The participation of worker organizations 
risk turning the enforcement of wage and hour laws into an even more 
politicized issue. This risk, therefore, speaks to the need to consider such 
flexible arrangements with both employers and worker organizations to 
help negate the idea that the agency is favoring one group over the other. 
Third, the challenge with such cooperative approaches is that they 
simply are not realistic for many jurisdictions. The success of these 
cooperative arrangements relies on a baseline of anti-wage theft 
strategies as well as sustained and sufficient agency funding. Agencies 
should be able to more easily leverage such arrangements with employer 
networks or worker organizations if they have within their arsenal some 
of the less common and innovative strategies, such as non-civil penalties 
or expanded liability based on a broader definition of employer.365 
Beyond the pre-existing legal framework, there needs to be the political 
willingness of government to make such arrangements possible. Yet not 
all geographic locations have willing agencies, robust worker 
organizations, or cooperative employers that can play these roles.366 
Whether such arrangements are formal or informal, they cannot occur 
without “facilitative leaders” on both sides of the cooperative 
agreement.367 
C. Looking Beyond Regulation 
While we do not reject regulation altogether, it is worthwhile to look 
beyond governmental regulation to address wage theft. In particular, 
some Republican-leaning jurisdictions that have been left out of the 
recent wave of anti-wage theft legislation cannot realistically rely on 
regulation at all. Nongovernmental strategies that rely on worker 
organizing, therefore, offer a way to address wage theft through direct 
negotiations, online information sharing, and public shaming. 
Workers may directly negotiate with employers through a union or 
other mechanisms to ensure the proper payment of wages for their work. 
                                                     
363. Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace, supra note 213, at 350–51; Fine & Gordon, 
supra note 8, at 561. 
364. See Fine & Gordon, supra note 8, at 572 (describing concern about abuse of power by unions). 
365. See supra Section IV.A for a summary.  
366. Fine, New Approaches, supra note 333, at 152, 174. 
367. Ansell & Gash, supra note 308, at 554–55. 
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Unions have stepped up their efforts to help workers who have suffered 
wage theft.368 The fissured workplace, however, has made traditional 
union organizing more difficult as many low-wage workers no longer 
work in a centralized workplace for a single employer.369 As a result, 
other types of worker organizing have flourished through worker 
centers. Such centers support workers so that they can directly demand 
their wages from employers.370 These centers also create opportunities 
for workers to collectively negotiate set standards for wages and wage 
payment.371 Centro Humanitario in Denver, for example, sets the terms 
and conditions for the hiring of day laborers with employers.372 In 
exchange for matching employers with workers, “employers agree to 
pay each worker directly, at a minimum rate of $15/hour.”373 Employers 
that fail to meet such standards can no longer participate in the 
program.374 Worker centers have also helped to support the creation of 
worker cooperatives, which serve as another mechanism for ensuring 
that workers are able to set their own working terms and conditions.375 
La Colectiva, a domestic worker collective in California, has a 
guaranteed hourly wage between $11 and $17 per hour, with a three 
hour minimum, for all of its members.376 
When there are specific wage theft problems with employers, workers 
have taken direct action to publicly shame them. Such direct actions 
involve picketing, protesting, or taking other highly visible action to 
highlight the issue of workplace exploitation. Workers capture the 
attention of employers with lively pickets that target foot traffic, impact 
commercial reputation, and garner media coverage.377 Direct actions are 
especially suitable at revealing wage theft by exposing the secrecy that 
typically accompanies employment relationships in low-wage 
                                                     
368. BOBO, supra note 21, at 95–99. 
369. Jeffrey M. Hirsch & Joseph A. Seiner, A Modern Union for the Modern Economy, 86 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1727, 1739–40 (2018).  
370. BOBO, supra note 21, at 109–10; FINE, WORKER CENTERS, supra note 65, at 78. 
371. Jayesh Rathod, Danger and Dignity: Immigrant Day Laborers and Occupational Risk, 46 
SETON HALL L. REV. 813, 853–54 (2016); VALENZUELA JR. ET AL., supra note 47, at 8–9. 
372. Employment Programs, CENTRO HUMANITARIO, http://www.centrohumanitario.org/ 
programs/employment/ [https://perma.cc/Q8ZH-6A7N]. 
373. Id. 
374. Email from Johnathon Prather, Worker Ctr. Coordinator, Centro Humanitario (Jan. 4, 2019, 
10:51 CST) (on file with authors). 
375. FINE, WORKER CENTERS, supra note 65, at 78. 
376. Elizabeth J. Kennedy & Michael B. Runnels, Bringing New Governance Home: The Need 
for Regulation in the Domestic Workplace, 81 UMKC L. REV. 899, 911 (2013). 
377. FINE, WORKER CENTERS, supra note 65, at 82. 
09 - Lee & Smith.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/30/2019  10:38 AM 
820 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:759 
 
industries.378 Domestic Workers United (DWU), for example, has been 
at the forefront of exposing the privacy of domestic work, such as 
childcare, housekeeping, or elder care, and engaged in regular gatherings 
in front of employer homes in demonstrations of shame when those 
employers fail to pay.379 
Workers are also increasingly using online forums to share 
information with other workers about their experiences with employers, 
including whether they engage in wage theft. The website 
contratados.org, created and maintained by the migrant rights 
organization Centro de los Derechos del Migrante, shares information 
about employers for temporary visa workers in the United States.380 It 
allows workers to post reviews of labor recruiters and employers for 
whom they have worked, which include information about whether they 
were paid for all hours worked.381 Prospective employees can then 
search for different employers when considering which jobs they might 
take when seeking visas to come to the United States.382 A smartphone 
app is under development in New York City for day laborers to rate 
employers.383 Workers also use online sites like Indeed and Glassdoor to 
post information about their employment experiences.384 Like consumer 
reviews of businesses, these sites potentially provide workers with a 
platform to publicly review their employers, which can include employer 
conduct regarding wage theft. 
Worker organizations have also sought to leverage consumer pressure 
to publicize wage problems and address wage theft. The following 
examples involve the use of consumer pressure, which goes beyond 
addressing the singular issue of wage theft to the broader issue of 
improving wages and working conditions for workers. The renowned 
Fair Food Program by the Coalition of Immokalee Workers (CIW) has 
                                                     
378. THEODORE, supra note 78, at 13. 
379. Eileen Boris & Premilla Nadasen, Domestic Workers Organize!, 11 WORKINGUSA: J. LAB. 
& SOC’Y 413, 427 (2008). 
380. Do You Have a TN Visa? Know Your Rights!, CENTRO DE LOS DERECHOS DEL MIGRANTE, INC., 
https://contratados.org/en/content/do-you-have-tn-visa-know-your-rights [https://perma.cc/YA4R-YTLC]. 
381. Id. 
382. Id.  
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succeeded in publicly exposing how market mechanics manage to 
exploit farm workers by urging consumers to pressure well-known 
businesses at the top of the supply chain.385 CIW then enters into legally 
binding agreements with participating buyers, ranging from McDonald’s 
to Trader Joe’s, which requires them to commit to pay the “Fair Food 
Premium” and to suspend purchases from agricultural employers who 
have failed to abide by fair labor practices.386 The Milk with Dignity 
campaign targeted Ben and Jerry’s to improve the wages and working 
conditions of workers in the dairy supply chain in Vermont.387 In 2015, 
after organizing actions at Ben & Jerry’s shops across the nation, an 
agreement was signed that included paying a premium to workers and 
providing for third party monitoring of the code of conduct, which 
includes receiving worker complaints, addressing grievances, and 
enforcing consequences for non-compliance.388 Restaurant Opportunities 
Center United (ROC) created a consumers’ association called Diners 
United that seeks to mobilize restaurant diners in support of livable 
wages and working conditions.389 Further, it seeks to publicize high road 
employers through its Restaurants Advancing Industry Standards in 
Employment (RAISE), which includes restaurant employers committed 
to raising wages and working conditions for workers.390 
The ultimate challenge with such nongovernmental advocacy, 
however, is that there are currently an insufficient number of unions, 
worker centers, or other nonprofit organizations that exist across the 
country to engage in this kind of advocacy. Those jurisdictions that are 
least likely to enact anti-wage theft laws may also be least likely to have 
a robust worker organization. That raises the critical issue of what 
nongovernmental strategies can be effective in those places. Information 
sharing mechanisms provide a potential to reach beyond specific 
jurisdictions. Consumer pressure, too, offers a way to hold nationwide 
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businesses at the top of the supply chain accountable, such that efforts 
can have impacts beyond traditionally progressive jurisdictions. Further, 
local organizations that recognize the issue of wage theft within their 
communities may need to seek out support for capacity building and 
fundraising from more well-established organizations within the state.391 
As nongovernmental advocacy provides a strong counterpoint to wage 
theft, it suggests that worker movements may want to consider the ways 
in which strengthening such organizing within and across communities 
may be more beneficial than getting new anti-wage theft laws enacted. 
CONCLUSION 
Low-wage workers will undoubtedly face wage theft and other forms 
of workplace exploitation for the foreseeable future. Meanwhile, federal 
enforcement efforts will likely continue to languish in the short term. 
Given the current climate, addressing workplace rights at the state and 
local levels continues to be necessary. Yet enacting laws that rely on 
commonly failed regulatory strategies will likely also result in failure. 
Instead, this Article identifies several promising possibilities for traction 
in the protracted fight against wage theft. These include regulatory 
strategies that: (1) expand the way in which agencies learn about 
problems, such as anonymous complaints, community organizations, 
and wage reports from employers; (2) hold high-risk employers 
accountable before wage theft happens, such as through licensing or 
wage bond requirements; and (3) require interactive educational efforts 
that are specifically tailored for employer and worker populations. 
Newly enacted laws too may not always be the answer. Rather, 
advocating for different approaches by government may more readily 
reduce wage theft. Government can potentially regulate more effectively 
if it rejects a one-size-fits-all approach and collaborates with employer 
networks and worker organizations. Further, nongovernmental solutions 
may provide a better answer, particularly in places where reform at the 
state and local level is unlikely. While such efforts are not yet 
widespread, they provide a window into how workers can use public 
pressure, by organizing cooperatives, direct actions, online discussions, 
or consumers, to rebalance the power between employers and workers. 
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